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Government officials have recently been scrutinized for using information
acquired in the performance of their official duties to gain market-trading advantages. Lobbyists have similarly been criticized for collecting material nonpublic political information from Capitol Hill contacts and selling it to their
clients—notably hedge funds—who presumably use the information in their
market transactions. Is this insider trading? Most likely not. Should it be? A
few members of Congress have responded by introducing legislation in the past
three Congresses that would bring trading on this “political intelligence,” by
government insiders and outsiders, under the umbrella of the federal securities
laws. Unsurprisingly, the legislation has failed to garner significant political
support. But a renewed fervor for “cleaning up” Washington ushered in by the
Obama Administration, coupled with the current economic crisis, has reinvigorated the campaign. The legislation was reintroduced and received a hearing
in 2009. In addition, recent academic scholarship is now calling for the passage of this legislation in order to bring trading on political intelligence under
the federal insider trading regime.
This Comment takes issue with the insider trading approach. It argues
that the federal securities laws are an inappropriate and ineffective legal mechanism for remedying issues of political ethics. First, as it pertains to govern-
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ment insiders, this Comment recommends an ethics approach, such as mandatory blind trusts, to deal with financial conflicts of interest. Second, with
gard to outside actors, such as lobbyists and hedge funds, it argues for public
disclosure of political-intelligence gathering activities. This Comment argues
against prohibiting trading on political intelligence by outside actors because
these actors are merely the Washington equivalents of market analysts, whose
information gathering functions are perfectly legitimate, if not desirable. Lastly, this Comment warns that insider trading regulation of political intelligence
would have two distinct chilling effects: one on democratic process, by hampering dialogue between lawmakers and constituents, and another on market efficiency, by discouraging valuable information gathering.
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INTRODUCTION
On Tuesday, November 15, 2005, day traders grew perplexed by
1
irregular price fluctuations in USG Corporation’s stock. USG stock
was trading at double its normal volume and gained $2.12 to close at
2
$61.55. USG was not alone. W.R. Grace and Crown Holdings—
companies like USG that had used asbestos materials in manufacturing and that had been mired in litigation for years—experienced simi1

See Eamon Javers, Washington Whispers to Wall Street, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 26, 2005,
at 42 (discussing the confusion among day traders regarding increased trading of USG
Corporation stock despite a lack of public news that would typically spur such activity).
2
Id.; see also Press Release, Congressman Brian Baird, Reps. Baird and Slaughter
Introduce Legislation to Prohibit Insider Trading on Capitol Hill (May 16, 2007),
available at http://www.house.gov/list/press/wa03_baird/stockact.html (“On November 15, 2005, the stock of a building materials company in Chicago (USG Corp) suddenly doubled, despite the fact that there was no publicly available news about the
company, or industry, which explained the increase in volume.”).
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3

lar irregular gains. At the same time, stock prices of peer companies
4
in the same sector remained flat, as did the market as a whole.
The following day, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist delivered news
promising a full Senate vote on a bill that would create a $140 billion
government-backed trust fund for liability claims against asbestos-using
5
manufacturers. The announcement marked a great advance for the
legislation, which had been on Congress’s agenda for four years and
6
had previously made little progress. A full Senate vote was welcomed
by shareholders of affected companies, as asbestos-related litigation had
plagued hundreds of companies that had once used asbestos in their
7
manufactured goods. The legislation therefore had broad market implications for affected companies. One Washington lobbyist noted that
“[e]very advancement or setback and every hint of activity on the bill
had a direct impact on this small but well-defined group of compa8
nies.” To demonstrate the market effects of an asbestos-liability trust
fund, when the Senate Judiciary Committee gave its approval to a similar bill in 2003, USG’s share price immediately rose by 8.3%, W.R.
9
Grace’s by 7.9%, and Georgia-Pacific’s by 9.2%.
Senator Frist’s announcement, coupled with the irregular trading
10
that had preceded it, drew suspicion. Senator Frist, who as Majority
3

Brody Mullins & Kara Scannell, Hedge Funds Hire Lobbyists to Gather Tips in Washington, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2006, at A1.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
See id. (“For 30 years, manufacturers, trial lawyers, insurers and labor unions
have been fighting over how to deal with more than 700,000 Americans who contended they got cancer from exposure to asbestos. The lawsuits clogged U.S. courts
and cast uncertainty over hundreds of U.S. companies that once used asbestos in their
products. Dozens of companies filed for bankruptcy due to their asbestos liabilities.”).
8
See id. (quoting Elliott Portnoy, an attorney with Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, who was hired to lobby against the asbestos legislation “on behalf of investors
in a manufacturer that declared bankruptcy because of asbestos liabilities”).
9
Jim Snyder, K Street Phones Wall Street: Political Inside Info for Hedge Funds Moves
Stock Prices, HILL, Feb. 15, 2005, at 1, available at LEXIS.
10
See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 3 (“SEC officials asked preliminary questions
about how the information could have leaked. But the agency hasn’t yet followed up
with Mr. Frist’s office or with the Senate lawyer . . . .”); John Byrne, Democrats Want Ethics Committee to Probe ‘Day Trading’ Allegations, RAW STORY, Jan. 19, 2006,
http://www.rawstory.com/news/2005/Democrats_want_ethics_committee_to_probe_
0119.html (“House Democrats are pushing the ethics committee to investigate allegations of congressional offices providing privleged [sic] information to Wall Street investors.”); Interview by Air Am. Radio, The Majority Report, with Representative Louise
Slaughter ( Jan. 18, 2006) (“‘I’m going to track this down, I know it’s true,’ Slaughter
told us, ‘that Frist, DeLay and probably others had some day traders working out of
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Leader had discretion to schedule full Senate votes, had been careful
11
to keep his intentions quiet. Nevertheless, in the two days prior to
the public announcement, share prices of USG increased 5.4%, W.R.
12
Grace jumped 4.2%, and Crown Holdings grew by 3.2%. The positive market reaction to the trust-fund approval by the Senate Judiciary
Committee in 2003 indicated that the market would react positively
13
again this time. But this time the bounce occurred prior to the public announcement.
The legislation eventually died the following February when it
failed to receive the sixty-member vote needed “to waive a budget ob14
jection raised about the legislation.”
The episode, however, left
many questions surrounding the irregular trading that occurred prior
to the official announcement of the full Senate vote: How did material nonpublic political information find its way to the market?
Through whose lips did the information pass? And for whose benefit?
The asbestos-announcement leak has been credited to the discreet
and virtually unknown Washington practice of “political intelligence”
15
gathering. Fueled primarily by hedge funds, K Street lobbyists (intheir offices.’”), as quoted in Posting of Josh Orton to Daily Kos, Insider Trading in Frist
and Delay’s [sic] Office: Story Growing, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2006/
1/19/17445/7449 ( Jan. 19, 2006).
11
Mullins & Scannell, supra note 3. Senator Frist’s staff reported that they were
careful not to tell many people of the Senator’s plans “because they wanted their boss to
make a splash.” Id. An advance copy of the announcement was given to the Reuters
news service on the evening prior to the speech, but Reuters was told that the announcement could not be published until the morning of the speech. Id. Additionally,
Senator Frist conveyed the information to the bill’s sponsor, Senator Arlen Specter. Id.
12
Id. These increases were “more than competitors in their respective sectors.”
Id. Additionally, during this time the Dow Jones Industrial Average remained “essentially flat.” Id.
13
The market, however, did not respond with the expected optimism. On the
Wednesday of Senator Frist’s speech, USG prices remained flat, W.R. Grace decreased
by 0.6%, and Crown Holdings rose 2.3%. Id. One possible explanation is that, by the
time of the Wednesday announcement, the market had already adjusted to reflect the
leaked information.
14
Stephen Labaton, Asbestos Bill Is Sidelined by the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,
2006, at C1.
15
See Javers, supra note 1, at 42 (“But the news got to key Wall Street players a day
early via a little-known pipeline: a small group of firms specializing in ‘political intelligence’ that mine the capital for information and translate Washington wonkspeak into
trading tips.”); Press Release, Congressman Brian Baird, Rep. Baird Takes on Capitol
Hill Insider Trading (Dec. 16, 2005), available at http://www.house.gov/
list/press/wa03_baird/BizWeek121605.html (“Congressman Baird tipped a reporter at
Business Week to the ‘political intelligence’ business. A Business Week article published today confirms the existence of the practice and notes that, just last month, investors profited in advance of a major asbestos liability speech and policy push by Se-
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cluding lawyer-lobbyists at several prominent law firms) have cultivated
the lucrative niche of ferreting out little-known political information
and funneling it to Wall Street. They translate political knowledge into
16
As just demonstrated, when political intelligence
economic profit.
signaled that companies bogged down by asbestos litigation might be
17
salvaged through a trust fund, their market value instantly rose.
U.S. federal securities laws police abusive insider trading practices
that threaten the integrity of the financial markets. Corporate insiders who possess material nonpublic information about their firms are
precluded from trading in their companies’ securities based on that
18
information. In many instances, outsiders who receive inside “tips”
are similarly precluded.
In recent years, the investment behavior of elected public officials
19
has received scrutiny. Additionally, the practice of political outsiders
acquiring material nonpublic political information from Capitol Hill
20
insiders has received a great deal of publicity. Hedge funds employ
Washington lobbyists to gather political intelligence that is then presumably relied upon in making investment decisions.
Are government insiders who trade on material nonpublic political
information violating insider trading laws? And are outsiders who trade
on advance political knowledge gathered by highly paid lobbyists similarly in violation of U.S. securities laws? If not, should they be?

nate Majority Leader Bill Frist.”); Press Release, Baird, supra note 2 (“What the public
didn’t know yet, but what some investors discovered through back channels and political intelligence companies, was that then–Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist had quietly
decided to move forward with legislation to relieve companies, such as USG Corp, of
their liabilities in asbestos related lawsuits.”). One Washington firm has gone so far as
to claim credit for providing political intelligence in the area of asbestos reform. See
Pub. Law & Policy Strategies, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, Information Capital
&
Political
Intelligence,
http://www.sonnenschein.com/docs/
docs_plps/Information_Capital.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
16
See infra Section I.B.
17
For example, hedge funds would not likely invest in the bonds of a bankrupt asbestos-products manufacturer because there is no guarantee that the bonds would ever
pay out. Kristin Jensen, Mike Forsythe & J.D. Salant, Hedge Funds Hire Lobbyists for Inside
Tips on U.S. Legislation, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 16, 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=10000103&sid=aYbb6sQ4HmGc&refer=us. However, “[a] hedge fund
might take the gamble, for example, of buying an Owens Corning [a bankrupted asbestos-using manufacturer] note, due in 2009, that Friday was selling for 63 cents on the dollar on a bet that a settlement will allow companies to recover and pay their debts.” Id.
18
See infra Section II.A.
19
See infra Section I.A.
20
See infra Section I.B.
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This Comment explores the relevance and application of the federal securities laws to the trading practices of actors who are privy to
material nonpublic political information—i.e., political intelligence.
21
These actors include (1) “government insiders,” such as politicians
and their staff members who have direct access to inside political in22
formation, and (2) outside actors, such as lobbyists and investment
funds who receive political intelligence indirectly.
The contemporary literature dealing with government insider
trading is relatively sparse. Several scholars—at different times and on
different theories—have argued that insider trading doctrine supports
liability for government officials who trade on inside political informa23
24
tion. Others disagree and advocate a legislative solution. While di21

The term “government insider” is borrowed from Herbert Krimmel. See Herbert T. Krimmel, Note, The Government Insider and Rule 10b-5: A New Application for an
Expanding Doctrine, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1491 (1974) (arguing that then-current doctrine
supported extending insider trading liability to government insiders).
22
The scope of consideration of government insiders here is limited to the legislative
branch. Further analysis should also examine officials and employees of the executive and
judicial branches. There is overlap among these various government insiders across all
branches of government, but full treatment is beyond the scope of this Comment.
23
In 1974, Herbert Krimmel argued that insider trading doctrine at that time sufficiently supported holding government insiders accountable under federal securities
laws. See Krimmel, supra note 21, at 1492 (“It is the thesis of this Note that government
insiders who use undisclosed government information for their personal benefit in the
sale or purchase of a security have violated rule 10b-5.”). In 1982, Professor Donald
Langevoort agreed with Krimmel despite the Supreme Court’s substantial restriction
of insider trading since Krimmel’s assertion a decade earlier. See Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CAL. L.
REV. 1, 3-4, 34-35 (1982) (arguing that “although the majority opinion [in Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980),] clearly limits the applicability of rule 10b-5 with
respect to trading by a person with an informational advantage over others in the marketplace, the Court’s emphasis on fiduciary duty leaves substantial flexibility for applying that rule in future cases,” which include the case of a government official who “has
an advantageous position as compared to the persons whom he is charged with serving”). Andrew George picked up where Krimmel and Langevoort left off and in 2008
argued that current doctrine still supports insider trading liability for government insiders, albeit under the modern misappropriation theory. See Andrew George, Public
(Self)-Service: Illegal Trading on Confidential Congressional Information, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 161, 163 (2008).
24
Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge as well as a group of law students that includes
Matthew Barbabella, Daniel Cohen, Alex Kardon, and Peter Molk separately argue that
current federal securities doctrine cannot clearly sustain holding government insiders
liable. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act
(UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Economics Research Paper No. 09-16, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1449744 (arguing that insider trading liability under the
federal securities laws should be extended to members of Congress and that the Constitution does not hinder such an extension); Matthew Barbabella, Daniel Cohen, Alex
Kardon & Peter Molk, Insider Trading in Congress: The Need for Regulation, 9 J. BUS. &
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vided on approach, this literature shares a common desire to bring
trading on political information by government insiders under the
umbrella of the federal securities laws.
This Comment takes issue with regulating political intelligence
through federal securities law. First, it challenges the literature’s assumption that insider trading law should regulate government insiders’
use of political intelligence. Second, it extends the debate beyond government insiders and considers the application of insider trading liability to outside actors who trade on political information, a topic that has
not yet been addressed and that has far-reaching ramifications.
Part I introduces these actors and analyzes the prevalence of their
trading practices as well as existing laws and congressional ethics rules
that purport to curtail trading on political information. Doing so reveals a deficiency in current law that allows members of Congress not
only to trade on information acquired on the job, but also to vote on
legislation that may materially affect their already-held investments.
Part II provides an overview of current federal securities law and doctrine. It applies this doctrine to political-intelligence trading and
finds that current law can sustain liability only by drastically manipulating current doctrine. Part III considers legislative proposals recently introduced in the U.S. Congress and insider trading laws in the
United Kingdom. Specifically, it analyzes the legislation introduced in
recent Congresses by Representatives Brian Baird and Louise Slaughter, which seeks to categorically ban trading on political information,
as well as the U.K. law that achieves this same prohibition. Part IV asks
whether the theory and justifications underlying U.S. insider trading
law support its expansion to encompass trading on political intelligence and concludes that only a few of the many policy concerns animating insider trading prohibitions are relevant to politicalintelligence trading.
Part V concludes with recommendations. First, it advocates a legislative solution that would prohibit trading on political information by
government insiders but not under the rubric of federal securities law.
It argues that insider trading law should not be stretched to its breaking
point simply to remedy what is really a problem of political ethics. Nor
are the federal securities laws the most effective way to combat congressional ethical lapses generally. Rather, Part V proposes a requirement
that government insiders place their assets in blind trusts, thereby meetSEC. L. 199, 237 (2008) (“[T]he legality of Congressional insider trading constitutes an
unfortunate gap in securities law—one that should be filled by an amended version of
the STOCK Act, or some other similar regulation.”).
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ing all the concerns underlying the insider trading proposals without
disrupting federal securities law. This rule would require members of
Congress to place their assets under the management of a trustee, who
would divest the trust of the original assets known to the member and
then make new investments. The rule would also limit communications
between members of Congress and the trustee so as to prevent the
25
member from learning of the trust’s newly acquired assets. As a result,
Part V argues, a blind-trust requirement is more effective than the insider
trading approach. Whereas insider trading regulation would only preclude government insiders from buying or selling assets after acquiring political intelligence but before public disclosure, the blind-trust approach
would also prevent government insiders from voting in a way that materially affects their existing market positions.
Second, Part V proposes broad disclosure requirements on lobbyists who are hired to ferret out political intelligence. It does not advocate prohibiting outside actors from trading on political intelligence, primarily because political-intelligence gatherers are the
Washington equivalent of market analysts and researchers whose conduct is perfectly legitimate, if not desirable.
Lastly, Part V warns that extending the federal securities laws to
outside actors would make trading on legislative information potentially incriminating and, accordingly, produce two distinct chilling effects. First, democratic processes would be harmed by chilling critical
dialogue between lawmakers and constituent groups. Second, market
efficiency would be jeopardized by discouraging information gathering that functions to efficiently deliver knowledge to the marketplace.
This Comment explores relationships between some of the most vilified actors in the public sphere today. Recent political scandals and
controversies have brought to light flagrant instances of illegal and un26
ethical conduct of some elected officials, conduct that was aided in
25

See infra notes 302-09 and accompanying text.
Several members of Congress have given up or lost their seats in recent years because of involvement in corruption scandals. Members include Senator Ted Stevens (RAK) in 2008, Representative Bob Ney (R-OH) in 2007, Representative Tom DeLay (RTX) in 2006, and Representative Duke Cunningham (R-CA) in 2005. Senator Stevens
was found guilty by a jury in 2008 for failing to reveal tens of thousands of dollars in gifts
he received from an oil-services executive, but his conviction was later voided because of
“prosecutorial missteps.” See Editorial, The Ted Stevens Scandal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2009,
at A18 (denouncing the misconduct of the prosecutors who pursued Senator Stevens’s
case); Posting of Susan Davis & Brent Kendall to Washington Wire, Jury Finds Sen. Stevens Guilty of Failing to Report Gifts, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2008/10/27/juryfinds-sen-stevens-guilty-of-failing-to-report-gifts (Oct. 27, 2008) (describing the conviction
of Stevens for concealing gifts in violation of federal law). Bob Ney pled guilty and was
26
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27

many instances by K Street lobbyists. In addition, many have quickly
attributed the current economic crisis, in part, to obscure and unregu28
lated hedge funds. Even prior to and independent of the financial
crisis, hedge funds were the source of numerous securities fraud inves29
tigations and accusations. Legislative action has been swift in the face
30
31
Simultaof these political controversies and the economic crisis.

sentenced to thirty months in jail for his involvement with lobbyist Jack Abramoff’s corrupt activities. See Susan Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, Ney Sentenced to 30 Months in Prison
for Abramoff Deals, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2007, at A3. Then–House Majority Leader Tom
DeLay resigned from his leadership position and declined to run for reelection in 2006
after a grand jury indicted him for violating campaign finance laws and his former staffer
pled guilty to conspiracy and corruption charges related to the Abramoff scandal. See
Jonathan Weisman & Chris Cillizza, DeLay to Resign from Congress, WASH. POST, Apr. 4,
2006, at A1. Duke Cunningham pled guilty to taking $2.4 million in bribes, was sentenced to eight years and four months in jail, and was ordered to pay $1.8 million in restitution. See Tony Perry, The Penalty Is Severe for Cunningham, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at 1,
available at 2006 WLNR 6956166.
27
Former lobbyist Jack Abramoff is currently serving jail time for his involvement
in a major political scandal. See Richard B. Schmitt, Ex–GOP Lobbyist Abramoff Sentenced
to 4 Years in Prison, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2008, at 23, available at 2008 WLNR 16823739.
Abramoff pled guilty to defrauding American Indian tribes and corrupting public officials. See Susan Schmidt & James V. Grimaldi, Abramoff Pleads Guilty to 3 Counts, WASH.
POST, Jan. 4, 2006, at A1 (summarizing the charges against Abramoff of “fraud, tax
evasion, and conspiracy to bribe public officials”). His testimony implicated members
of Congress, Capitol Hill staff, and White House officials. See id. (reporting the extent
of the scandal, which involved Tom DeLay and Bob Ney). Former Representative
DeLay’s staffer and lobbyist Tony Rudy also pled guilty to conspiracy charges related to
the Abramoff scandal. See Philip Shenon, Ex–DeLay Aide Pleads Guilty in Lobby Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2006, at A1.
28
See, e.g., Hedge Funds and the Financial Market: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Government Reform of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. (2008)
(statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman), available at http://oversight.house.gov/
images/stories/documents/20081113100820.pdf (examining the danger that hedge
funds might pose to economic stability); see also Tom Hamburger, Financial System in
Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at 1, available at 2008 WLNR 18977026 (reporting that
Congress will certainly place blame for the financial crisis, in part, on hedge funds).
29
See, e.g., Examining Enforcement of Criminal Insider Trading and Hedge Fund Activity:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1-3 (2006) (statement of Sen.
Arlen Specter) (expressing concern over the frequency of insider trading in hedge
funds); Greg N. Gregoriou & William Kelting, Hedge Fund Fraud (asserting that the lack
of regulation of hedge funds coupled with hedge funds’ “performance-based remuneration structures” have led to increased speculation that hedge funds are participating
in insider trading or other forms of securities fraud), in INSIDER TRADING 167, 168
(Paul U. Ali & Greg N. Gregoriou eds., 2009).
30
See, e.g., Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-81, 121 Stat. 735 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 & 18 U.S.C.) (requiring heightened and more frequent disclosure of lobbying activities, lobbyists’ political contributions, and member-supported earmarks in appropriations legislation).
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neously, the Obama Administration stated an intention to “chang[e]
the culture of Washington” by placing strict limits on lobbyists serving
32
in government positions. As we move forward to consider the issues
presented here, we must be careful to make informed decisions that are
consistent with underlying law and public policy objectives and not to
resort to demagoguery for the sake of political expediency.
I. TRADING ON POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE
This Part considers the prevalence of trading on political information by government insiders and outside actors to demonstrate that
political intelligence can be very lucrative. It then analyzes and reveals
several deficiencies in current laws and ethics rules that attempt to
curtail these activities. First, there are no legal barriers preventing
government insiders or outside actors from trading on political information. Second, government insiders are not only able to trade on
information acquired while on the job; they are also able to make legislative decisions that will positively impact their existing portfolios.
This fact reveals that political-intelligence trading by government insiders is part of a larger problem of political corruption, not merely
insider trading. Third, unlike lobbyists who seek to influence legislative policy, lobbyists hired to ferret out political intelligence are not
required to publicly disclose those activities.
A. Government Insiders: Elected Officials and Capitol Hill Staffers
There is nothing new about politicians profiting on advance political knowledge. In fact, it is something of a tradition dating back to
the Founding Fathers. Following the ratification of the Constitution,
Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton persuaded Congress to redeem securities issued earlier by the federal government and the
33
states. The securities were redeemed at face value, despite the fact
that the market value of many securities had fallen to as low as ten
31

See, e.g., Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 26 U.S.C.) (authorizing the
Department of the Treasury to spend up to $700 billion to purchase distressed assets).
32
Dan Eggen, Lobbying Rules Keep Some Activists Out of Government, WASH. POST,
Mar. 22, 2009, at A1 (quoting President Obama).
33
See Sallie Gaines, Founding Fathers First Inside Traders, CHI. TRIB., May 17, 1987, at
1, available at 1987 WLNR 1405587; see also Jeffry M. Netter, Annette B. Poulsen & Philip L. Hersch, Insider Trading: The Law, the Theory, the Evidence, CONTEMP. POL’Y ISSUES,
July 1988, at 1 (introducing the Founding Fathers’ “massive insider trading scheme” as
background to the insider trading scandals of the 1980s).
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34

percent of their initial worth. Aware of the redemption plan, many
members of Congress bought up these securities in the market before
35
news of the redemption plan became public.
Those who got wind of Hamilton’s plans made a killing in some cases. . . . Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and other leaders of the new
government were said to be unhappy about their cohorts’ activities. But
there was nothing the critics could do. There was no Securities and Ex36
change Commission and no legal concept of insider trading.

Today, we have the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as
well as an accepted—albeit confusing and ad hoc—concept of insider
trading. Would the current regime have satisfied Jefferson and Madison by prosecuting profiteering politicians? That question is addressed in the next Section. This Section looks first to the prevalence
of this American pastime. It then analyzes current ethics laws to see if
they police today’s government insiders any better than they would
have policed our Founding Fathers.
1. Prevalence of Trading by Government Insiders
Elected officials and their staff—government insiders—often have
advance notice of key legislative, regulatory, or political decisions.
“While investors spend time worrying how their stocks will do, mem37
bers of Congress often already know.” Government insiders are not
simply aware of key decisions in advance but also are often directly involved in making those decisions. As one commentator has observed,
Members of Congress are privy to information that affects the market.
Few investors are better positioned to know when a new regulation is
about to derail a booming business; when a young firm is set to win its
first lucrative government contract; or whether a much-debated tax bill
38
will actually become law.

The academic literature dealing with members’ market activities is
relatively sparse. Two studies are instructive.
In the first study, Professor Gregory Boller from the University of
Memphis analyzed financial disclosure reports (FDRs) of members of

34
35
36
37
38

See Gaines, supra note 33.
Id.
Id.
Joy Ward, Taking Stock in Congress, MOTHER JONES, Sept.–Oct. 1995, at 16.
Sheila Kaplan, Congress’s Insider Traders, NATION, July 6, 1998, at 5.

2010]

Cashing in on Capitol Hill

1463

39

both houses of Congress.
He found that twenty-five percent of
members were investing in companies that faced ongoing legislative
40
action. Although his research has been criticized because it only
41
suggests a conflict, it provides strong anecdotal evidence indicating an
informational advantage for government insiders. Boller provides
several examples, one of which is that of former Senator Al D’Amato
of New York:
On Oct. 22, 1992, D’Amato purchased between $8,000 and $120,000
worth of stock in eight different public utilities. Two days later, President Bush signed the National Energy Policy Act. A part of the bill,
which wasn’t publicized, deregulated energy transmissions, offering
42
growth opportunities for many utilities.

Boller also provides the example of former Senator Lloyd Bentsen
of Texas:
On Feb. 22, 1991, then-Sen. Bentsen purchased stock (reported as between $1,000 and $15,000 in value) in food and dairy company Morningstar Foods. Four days later, an amendment to the National School
Lunch Act was introduced in the Senate to diversify milk choices for
lunch programs. On Dec. 23, 1991, Bentsen sold his stock. Eight days
later, Morningstar came under a Justice Department probe into bid43
rigging to sell milk in public schools.

This anecdote suggests that former Senator Bentsen knew not only
when to purchase stock in a company that would benefit from legislation but also when to sell stock that would be detrimentally affected by
a governmental investigation. Consider one final example involving
former Representative Newt Gingrich of Georgia:
In January 1992, Gingrich bought between $1,000 and $15,000 worth of
Boeing stock. Three weeks later, when the House introduced the NASA
Authorization Act, Gingrich helped kill amendments to cut funding for
the space station program. Later, Boeing became the prime contractor
44
for the station.

39

See Alan J. Ziobrowski, Ping Cheng, James W. Boyd & Brigitte J. Ziobrowski, Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of the U.S. Senate, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 661, 662 (2004) (summarizing Professor Boller’s findings); Ward, supra
note 37, at 16 (publishing Professor Boller’s results).
40
Ward, supra note 37, at 16.
41
See Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski, supra note 39, at 662 (“However, this
result merely suggests a potential conflict of interest. His research did not demonstrate that these investments yielded unusually large returns.”).
42
Ward, supra note 37, at 16.
43
Id.
44
Id.
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Former Representative Gingrich’s behavior suggests that not only do
members trade on political information in advance of the information’s public release but that members may also cast votes that directly
benefit their financial portfolios. This distinction is critical because,
as this Comment points out, regulating politicians’ behavior under insider trading will only, at most, curtail the former while leaving members free to make decisions perfectly aware of how those decisions will
benefit them financially.
A separate review of financial disclosure reports in 1997 demonstrated that many lawmakers make no attempt to stay away from industries
over which they would naturally appear to be conflicted because of their
45
political authority or committee assignments. This demonstrates that
public officials are not only well situated to access market-sensitive information, they are also in a position to make market-sensitive decisions.
The second study—by Alan Ziobrowski, Ping Cheng, James Boyd,
and Brigitte Ziobrowski (Ziobrowski study)—takes Professor Boller’s
insights one step further by demonstrating that congressional informational advantages translate into material economic benefits. The
Ziobrowski study looked for abnormal returns on the common stock
46
portfolios held by U.S. Senators from 1993 to 1998. The objective of
the research was to determine whether Senators’ investments outperformed the market, because such a showing would “support the notion that Senators use their informational advantage for personal
gain” and are “thereby using their unique position to increase their
47
personal wealth.” Similar to the Boller study, the Ziobrowski study
48
analyzed annual FDRs. Federal law requires that members of Con45

See Kaplan, supra note 38, at 5 (“An analysis by The Nation of Congressional disclosure reports for 1997, released in mid-June, shows that while some lawmakers avoid
buying stock in industries that coincide with their key areas of legislative responsibility—or put their assets into blind trusts—many do not.”).
46
Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski, supra note 39, at 661. The Ziobrowksi
et al. study has received a good deal of attention. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, Regulation
and Scholarship: Constant Companions or Occasional Bedfellows?, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 305,
309 (2008) (stating that the results “show that U.S. Senators are able to use their inside
information about forthcoming government action to obtain significant positive abnormal returns on their equity investments”); Bainbridge, supra note 24, at 1-2 (summarizing the study’s results); Press Release, Baird, supra note 2 (citing the study).
47
Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski, supra note 39, at 662.
48
Id. Though the published Ziobrowski study only considered the U.S. Senate,
id., an unpublished study concerning the U.S. House of Representatives also found
abnormal returns. See Preventing Unfair Trading by Government Officials: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th
Cong. (2009) (proposed statement of Alan J. Ziobrowski, Ph.D., Robinson College of
Business, Georgia State University), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/
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gress publicly disclose all common stock transactions in FDRs each
49
year.
The study scrutinized the sales and purchases of common
50
stock—“trigger events”—during a six-year period from 1993 to 1998.
The results are staggering. Portfolios that mirror the purchases of U.S.
51
Senators outperformed the market by eighty-five basis points—nearly
52
one percent—each month. Portfolios mimicking the sales of Sena53
tors underperformed the market by twelve basis points per month
over the twelve months following the sale, meaning that the Senators
in the study sold stocks that then went on to perform poorly relative to
54
the market. Consequently, Senators beat the market by nearly twelve
55
percent per year.
Further, the study also looked for cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs), which are the difference between the expected return of a

hearing/financialsvcs_dem/ziobrowski_testimony.pdf [hereinafter Hearing on Preventing Unfair Trading by Government Officials] (noting that the House study showing that
returns on common stock investments by House members “beat the market” was never
published because it “contain[ed] nothing new”).
49
See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
50
Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski, supra note 39, at 662. It is also significant to note that the reporting of trigger events by the FDRs does not occur until five
to seventeen months after the purchase or sale. This is important because any “subsequent returns of these stocks could not have been market reactions to the actual transactions themselves.” Id. The authors conclude that “[a]ny statistically significant abnormal returns therefore would likely be the result of reactions to events anticipated by
Senators and motivated [by] their transactions.” Id. (emphasis added). The study was limited to six years because FDRs are, by law, only retained for six years before being
destroyed. Id. at 669 n.3.
51
“Outperforming” the market means that the stock or portfolio did better than
the stock market overall.
52
Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski, supra note 39, at 663. This is using a calendar-time approach with the Fama-French three-factor model and the Capital Asset
Pricing Model. For a thorough explanation of the data and research design, see id. at
663-66. Portfolios mirroring common stock investments by members of the House of
Representatives outperformed the market by approximately one-half of one percent per
month, or six percent annually, from 1985 to 2001. Hearing on Preventing Unfair Trading
by Government Officials, supra note 48, at 3 (proposed statement of Alan J. Ziobrowski).
53
“Underperforming” the market means that the stock or portfolio did worse
than the stock market overall.
54
Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski, supra note 39, at 663.
55
See Hearing on Preventing Unfair Trading by Government Officials, supra note 48, at 3
(proposed statement of Alan J. Ziobrowski) (“Common stock investments made by
Senators beat the market by approximately 1% per month or 12% per year from 1993
to 1998.”); Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski, supra note 39, at 675 (finding that,
when combining buy and sell transactions in a hedged portfolio, “Senators outperform
the market by 97 basis points (nearly 1%) per month on a trade-weighted basis”).
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56

particular stock and the actual return of that stock. The CARs of
stocks purchased by U.S. Senators were “near zero” over the calendar
57
year prior to being purchased. CARs increased to more than twentyfive percent over the twelve months following the purchase of the
stock by a U.S. Senator, meaning that these stocks exceeded expecta58
tions. Abnormal returns on common stocks sold by U.S. Senators
were “near zero” over the twelve months after being sold but had been
twenty-five percent positive over the twelve months prior to being
59
sold. The point of sale usually represented a peak in abnormal re60
turn value. “These results suggest that Senators knew appropriate
61
times to both buy and sell their common stocks.”
Senators’ exceptional returns are economically significant. By way
of example, common stock returns for randomly selected households
over a similar period—1991 to 1996—found that the average household
62
underperformed the market by nearly twelve basis points. One could
easily argue that U.S. Senators are not average U.S. households. At the
very least, they are savvy enough to get themselves elected to high public office. Politicians are often well educated and have access to social
networks that may provide informational advantages apart from those
that they encounter while performing official duties.
Another study found, however, that corporate insiders who traded
in their respective companies earned abnormal returns ranging from
approximately fifty to approximately seventy basis points each
63
64
month, or six percent on an annual basis. While still significant,
56

See RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 360 (9th ed. 2008) (providing a formula to show that abnormal
return is the difference between the actual return on a security and the expected return on the security). Accordingly, a “cumulative daily abnormal return” is simply the
total daily abnormal return over a defined period of time for a specific security.
57
Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski, supra note 39, at 675.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 663.
61
Id. at 675.
62
Id. at 669 (citing Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your
Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773 (2000)).
63
See Leslie A. Jeng, Andrew Metrick & Richard Zeckhauser, Estimating the Returns
to Insider Trading: A Performance-Evaluation Perspective, 85 REV. ECON. & STATS. 453, 467
(2003) (looking at trading in company common stock during the period of 1975 to
1996 and concluding that “abnormal returns to a value-weighted portfolio of all insider
purchases—holding positions for 6 months—are between 52 and 68 basis points per
month, an economically and statistically significant magnitude”).
64
See id. at 456 (“Purchases . . . are followed by a positive CAR of about 6% over
the subsequent 100 days.”).
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the average abnormal returns of corporate insiders are only a fraction
65
(approximately one-fourth) of U.S. Senators’ abnormal returns.
Corporate insiders should be the most savvy, educated, and networked
investors, especially when investing in their own companies. Nevertheless, policymakers outperform corporate insiders, suggesting an informational advantage above and beyond mere talent and skill.
These studies provide compelling evidence that government insiders
possess a material informational advantage when investing in the market.
The Ziobrowski study concludes that, although the exact source and nature of market information are not known, “Senators have demonstrated
66
a definite informational advantage over other investors.”
2. Current Laws and Ethics Rules Affecting Government
Insiders’ Trading Practices
The Code of Ethics for Government Service (Code of Ethics) provides broad ethical guidelines for “all Government employees, includ67
ing officeholders.” It was passed as a concurrent resolution by Congress in 1958 and provides, in relevant part, that government employees
should “[n]ever use any information coming to [them] confidentially
in the performance of governmental duties as a means for making pri68
vate profit.” Though the concurrent resolution is not a legally binding
statute, the House of Representatives has incorporated it into the House
69
Consequently, covered individuals who violate the
Ethics Manual.
70
Code of Ethics can face formal charges. The Senate Ethics Manual,

65

The CARs for U.S. Senators were twenty-five percent. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
66
Ziobrowski, Cheng, Boyd & Ziobrowski, supra note 39, at 676. Ziobrowski,
Cheng, Boyd, and Ziobrowski conclude by recommending further investigation. Id.
They suggest examining the “financial transactions of members of the U.S. House of
Representatives, high-ranking officials of the Federal executive branch, and Federal
judges.” Id.
67
Code of Ethics for Government Service, H.R. Con. Res. 175, 85th Cong., 72
Stat. B12 (1958).
68
Id.
69
H. COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 110TH CONG., HOUSE ETHICS
MANUAL 20, 249 (2008) [hereinafter HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL], available at http://
ethics.house.gov/Media/PDF/2008_House_Ethics_Manual.pdf; see also Javers, supra
note 1, at 42 (“But ethics experts say no one’s breaking the rules. Hill staffers and government employees are forbidden from personally profiting from confidential data
and can’t share information that’s classified or deemed secret by their employers.”).
70
HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 69, at 20. In at least one instance the House
“reprimanded” a member who took official action that increased his personal finances.
Id. at 20-21 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1364, at 3 (1976)).
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however, does not explicitly incorporate the Code of Ethics but rather
71
lists it as a source of jurisdiction for the Senate Ethics Committee.
In addition to incorporating the Code of Ethics, the House Ethics
Manual prohibits “all Members, officers, and employees”—known as
“covered” individuals—from “improperly using their official positions
72
for personal gain.” Nonetheless, it does not require covered individuals to “divest themselves of assets” upon taking up a covered posi73
tion. Furthermore, members are not required to “disqualify themselves from voting on issues that generally affect their personal
74
financial interests.” Rather, the House of Representatives sets forth
broad financial disclosure requirements as “a means of monitoring
75
and deterring conflicts.”
Unlike the House ethics rules, neither the Senate Ethics Manual
nor the Senate Code of Conduct provide language prohibiting Senators from using information acquired while performing official duties
76
for personal profit. Like the House version, the Senate Ethics Manual
provides that “[a] Member or employee should never use the prestige
77
or influence of a position in the Senate for personal gain.” However,
like the House rules, the Senate rules provide sweeping language that
enables Senators to maintain market positions that potentially conflict
with official duties; members are not required to divest themselves of
assets, even where there are conflicts of interest. The Senate Ethics
Manual explains that
[u]nlike many officials in the executive branch, who are concerned with
administration and regulation in a narrow area, a Senator exercises
judgment concerning legislation across the entire spectrum of business
and economic endeavors. The wisdom of complete (unlike selective) di-

71

Cf. S. SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, 108TH CONG., SENATE ETHICS MANUAL 7-8
(2003) [hereinafter SENATE ETHICS MANUAL], available at http://ethics.senate.gov/
downloads/pdffiles/manual.pdf.
72
HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 69, at 247.
73
Id.; see also Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 89 (“Members of Congress are not
required to divest their financial holdings or put them in a blind trust. As a result,
members of Congress sometimes play key roles in passing or blocking legislation that
has a direct impact on their investments.”).
74
HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 69, at 247.
75
Id.
76
See S. SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, 110TH CONG., AN OVERVIEW OF THE SENATE
CODE OF CONDUCT AND RELATED LAWS (2007), available at http://ethics.senate.gov/
downloads/pdffiles/overview.pdf; SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 71. A search of
both documents reveals no prohibitive language.
77
SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 71, at 65.
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vestiture may also be questioned as likely to insulate a legislator from the
personal and economic interests that his or her constituency, or society
78
in general, has in governmental decisions and policy.
79

The House Ethics Manual provides similar reasoning.
In contrast, Senate committee staff who earn over $25,000 per
year are required to “divest themselves of any substantial holdings
which may be directly affected by the actions of the employing com80
mittee.”
Apart from the committee-staff exception, Senators and
employees of individual Senators are not required to divest themselves
81
of assets upon assuming their positions.
Additionally, as in the
House, Senators are not required to “disqualify themselves from vot82
ing on issues that generally affect their personal financial interests.”
Rather, the Senate and the House view financial disclosure as supe83
rior to divestiture. Public disclosure is seen as the best way to monitor
political conflicts of interest and enable constituencies to judge the fi84
nancial activity of their elected officials. To that end, House and Senate disclosure rules require that all members, officers, and certain em-

78

Id. at 124. The same language is provided in the HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra
note 69, at 250.
79
As the House Ethics Manual states,
Proposals for divestiture of potentially conflicting assets and mandatory disqualification of Members from voting were rejected as impractical or unreasonable.
Such disqualification could result in the disenfranchisement of a Member’s entire constituency on particular issues. A Member may often have a community
of interests with the Member’s constituency, and may arguably have been
elected because of and to serve these common interests, and thus would be ineffective in representing the real interests of the constituents if the Member was
disqualified from voting on issues touching those matters of mutual concern.
HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 69, at 249-50 (footnotes omitted).
80
SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 71, at 70. Oddly, this divestiture requirement does not apply to the Senate committee members themselves.
81
Id. at 124.
82
Id.
83
See id. (“The drafters of the original Senate Code of Official Conduct, in the 95th
Congress, considered ‘full and complete public financial disclosure’ to be ‘the heart of
the code of conduct.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-49, at 3 (1977))); see also HOUSE ETHICS
MANUAL, supra note 69, at 249 (“Financial disclosure provisions were enacted to monitor
and to deter possible conflicts of interest due to outside financial holdings.”); H.R. DOC.
NO. 95-73, at 9-10 (1977) (“In the case of investment income, then, the Commission’s
belief is that potential conflicts of interest are best deterred through disclosure and the
discipline of the electoral process. Other approaches are flawed both in terms of their
reasonableness and practicality, and threaten to impair, rather than to protect, the relationship between the representative and the represented.”).
84
See HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 69, at 251; SENATE ETHICS MANUAL,
supra note 71, at 124-25.
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ployees make available “financial information concerning themselves,
85
their spouses, and dependent children.” Congress condensed and
consolidated the financial disclosure requirements for federal govern86
ment officials into the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. FDRs are
required to contain information on “outside compensation, holdings,
87
transactions, liabilities, positions held and gifts received.” The idea is
that once FDRs are made available, the public will police investment
behavior where it conflicts with legislative responsibilities.
Congress has decisively chosen disclosure over abstention or divestiture. The Code of Ethics is merely a concurrent resolution without
force of law. Though the House has incorporated the Code of Ethics
and the Senate cites it as authority, critics note that it is blatantly un88
enforced.
At most, only a handful of members have been reprimanded, and neither the House nor the Senate requires members to
divest themselves of assets over which they have legislative jurisdiction
or to recuse themselves from voting at any time in ways that affect
their financial portfolios. This fact demonstrates that politicalintelligence trading is merely part of a larger problem of financial
conflicts of interest and political corruption, not just insider trading.

85

HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 69, at 247; accord SENATE ETHICS MANUAL,
supra note 71, at 124-25, 127. “Certain employees” refers to senior employees who
meet certain salary thresholds. SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 71, at 125-26.
86
Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5
& 28 U.S.C.). The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 then codified legislative branch disclosure
requirements. Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 10, 18, 26 & 31 U.S.C.). Recourse for failure to comply with the FDR requirement is limited to committee action and civil penalties. In addition to official Senate or House committee action for failure to comply with the FDR requirement, the
Attorney General can seek civil penalties from those who knowingly and willfully falsify or
fail to file required information. 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 104(a) (2006); see also HOUSE ETHICS
MANUAL, supra note 69, at 265; SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 71, at 127.
87
SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 71, at 125; accord HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL,
supra note 69, at 252.
88
See Posting of Rep. Louise Slaughter to Daily Kos, Follow-Up on Our Bill to Stop
Insider Trading in DeLay’s House (Congress), http://www.dailykos.com/story/
2006/4/5/164552/0893 (Apr. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Slaughter Follow-Up] (“[The
Code of Ethics clause] has never really been enforced, and it has not been adopted by
the Senate. Furthermore, it is part of the House Ethics Rules—it is not law, so the
practice is not illegal. In addition, the House ethics rule has absolutely no impact on
the sharing of this information with outside political intelligence firms for trading decisions.” (emphasis omitted)).
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B. Outside Actors: K Street Lobbyists and Wall Street Funds
While government insiders directly encounter or create marketsensitive information during the performance of official duties, outside actors actively engage in mining such information. In Washing89
ton, the practice has become quite lucrative. And for the investing
clientele, purchasing political intelligence is paying off. As one Washington firm advertised,
While Congress negotiated significant pension reform legislation behind
closed doors, our clients relied on our political intelligence gathering to inform them of the resolution of key outstanding issues that could affect their
90
investments.

1. The Rise of Political-Intelligence Gathering
The practice of gathering and selling political information prior
to its public release is nothing new. Investors realize that “[t]he invisible hand of the market sometimes takes cues from the long arm of
91
Washington.” The industry started with a few firms in the 1970s and
has taken off in recent years due to the “explosion of hedge funds,” a
92
new clientele with deeper pockets. One Washington insider predicts
that lobbying shops collectively generate $30 to $40 million in fees
93
from their political-intelligence practices annually. A Capitol Hill
staffer reported that her legislator’s office receives almost as many
phone calls asking about the status of legislation as they do seeking to
94
influence legislation.
Who are these firms? And who are their high-paying clients? Little is known about who exactly the players are. This is because lobbying firms are not required to publicly disclose their political89

See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 3 (interviewing Elliott Portnoy and attributing his being named chairman of Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP in part to his
success at cultivating a successful political-intelligence unit).
90
Pub. Law & Policy Strategies Group, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, Information Capital & Political Intelligence (emphasis added) (on file with author).
This sentence captures perfectly what “material nonpublic information” means in the
insider trading context. “Behind closed doors” essentially means nonpublic, and “affect their investments” signifies information that is material.
91
Snyder, supra note 9.
92
Javers, supra note 1, at 42.
93
Id.; see also Snyder, supra note 9 (interviewing Elliott Portnoy of Sonnenschein
Nath & Rosenthal LLP, who hinted that the firm’s annual revenue from politicalintelligence gathering was between $1 million and $5 million).
94
See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 3 (interviewing a congressional staffer, who
stated that “[t]he amount of insider trading going on in these halls is incredible”).
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95

intelligence clients. Traditional clients hire lobbyists to peddle influence on their behalf and accordingly are made public through the
96
disclosure requirements of the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA). Political-intelligence clients, on the other hand, do not actively influence
legislation. They do not send information or opinions to Capitol Hill
with the objective of affecting outcomes. Rather, political-intelligence
clients receive information. They do not speak but listen. As defined
97
by the LDA, these activities do not constitute “lobbying.”
What is known about this practice comes from media reports and
lobbying firms’ promotional materials. It is generally believed that the
98
primary clients of political-intelligence groups are hedge funds.
Hedge funds “pursue high-risk, high-yield investments for wealthy
99
clients.” Political intelligence is seen as more valuable to these funds
since they tend to hold assets over a shorter amount of time; mutual
funds, on the other hand, hold diversified portfolios over longer periods of time and do not have a similar potential to gain from placing
100
“What sets hedge funds
bets on the political winds of Washington.
apart is their ability to act instantly on news and to employ trading op101
tions that allow them to make money whether stocks rise or fall.”
This includes short selling, in which hedge funds borrow securities
and then sell the borrowed securities into the market with the expec102
Mutual
tation that they will buy them back when the price drops.
funds, on the other hand, are usually entrusted with retirement funds

95

See infra subsection I.B.2.
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2006 & Supp. I 2009).
97
See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
98
See Jeffrey Young, K Street Grows, Maybe Even Beyond Disclosure, HILL, Feb. 25,
2008, http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/3475-k-street-grows-maybe-even-beyonddisclosure (interviewing Rich Gold, head of the lobbying group at Holland & Knight,
who said that political intelligence has grown rapidly in the past five years because of
the “uptick in hedge fund issues”).
99
Jensen, Forsythe & Salant, supra note 17.
100
See Jim Snyder, Transparency Sought on ‘Political Intel,’ HILL, Apr. 4, 2006, at 6,
available at LEXIS. The logic that short-term investors, such as hedge funds, benefit
most from political intelligence is consistent with arguments that these investors are
likewise the greatest beneficiaries of other informational advantages apart from political intelligence. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING 13 (1991) (arguing that
informational advantages benefit sizable investors who “trade frequently enough to
reap the trading profits generated by that advice,” as opposed to small investors who, if
rational, follow long-term “buy-and-hold strategies”).
101
Jensen, Forsythe & Salant, supra note 17.
102
Id.
96

2010]

Cashing in on Capitol Hill

1473

and do not, or cannot, employ such practices because of substantive
103
SEC regulations that prohibit mutual funds from doing so.
A number of Washington firms have advertised their politicalintelligence practices directly or have spoken with the media. Many
firms involved in the practice can be identified through these commu104
nications, including Patton Boggs LLP, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosen105
106
107
thal LLP,
Washington Analysis,
PodestaMattoon,
Cormac
108
109
Group, Mehlman Vogel Castagnetti Inc., Bryan Cave Strategies
110
111
112
LLC, DLA Piper, Williams & Jensen, and Akin Gump Strauss
113
Hauer & Feld LLP. Hedge funds, by contrast, generally do not want
114
From various interto discuss their political-intelligence activities.

103

See id.; Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 22-24, on file with author) (“The ICA also
imposes substantive regulation on mutual funds. Funds are restricted in their use of
leverage. This limitation extends to short selling, which the SEC views as borrowing.
Funds are limited to holding a maximum of fifteen percent of their portfolios in illiquid assets and are also regulated in their use of options and other derivative products.”
(footnotes omitted)).
104
See Jensen, Forsythe & Salant, supra note 17 (interviewing former U.S. Senator
John Breaux, who represents the hedge fund Clinton Group Inc. on behalf of Patton
Boggs LLP).
105
See Snyder, supra note 9 (interviewing Elliott Portnoy of Sonnenschein Nath &
Rosenthal LLP, who reports having numerous political-intelligence clients).
106
See Javers, supra note 1, at 42 (interviewing Leslie Alperstein, a founder of
Washington Analysis, and reporting that the firm was sold in July 2005 “to China’s
Xinhua Finance, which is 6.5%-owned by the government-controlled Xinhua News
Agency”); see also Snyder, supra note 9 (interviewing Tim VandenBerg, a senior policy
analyst at Washington Analysis).
107
See Jensen, Forsythe & Salant, supra note 17 (interviewing Tony Podesta—
brother of John Podesta, former chief of staff to President Clinton—whose firm, PodestaMattoon, was retained by an unnamed hedge fund).
108
See id. (interviewing Jonathan Slade, lobbyist for Cormac Group, who reported
representing hedge fund GoldenTree Asset Management LP).
109
See id. (interviewing Alex Vogel, cofounder of Mehlman Vogel Castagnetti Inc.).
110
See id. (interviewing Steve Elmendorf, whose firm, Bryan Cave Strategies LLC,
represents a hedge fund).
111
See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 3 (interviewing Matthew Bernstein of DLA
Piper, who estimated that its “political-intelligence business has quadrupled in size” in
the three years between 2003 and 2006).
112
See Young, supra note 98 (interviewing Williams & Jensen Chairman and CEO J.
Steven Hart, who stated that the firm’s decline in reported lobbying revenue reflects
an increase in unreported political-intelligence work).
113
See Snyder, supra note 9 (interviewing Joel Jankowsky of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, who reported that the firm “does some political-intelligence work”).
114
See Jensen, Forsythe & Salant, supra note 17 (“[H]edge funds aren’t interested
in talking about [their political intelligence activities]: Companies among the 25 biggest funds . . . declined to comment for this story.”).
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views, however, one can discern that hedge fund players include Clin115
116
ton Group, Inc., GoldenTree Asset Management LP, and Carlson
117
Capital, L.P.
Lobbying firms are not shy about their ability to mine little-known
political information—this skill is precisely the product that they
118
hawk. Firms claim the capability to farm numerous substantive areas
for political intelligence, including climate control legislation, asbestos reform, tariff decisions, energy policy, the federal budget (including funding for health care, defense, and research), tax policy and
119
credits, and patent legislation. What is critical is not merely receiving information but receiving it before it is widely known. As one lobbyist bragged, “We provide customized political intelligence and de120
K Street is able to
liver the information ahead of the news cycle.”
access much of this information through political connections and
networks. Many of the lobbyists who have spoken with the press had
previously worked on Capitol Hill or in various administrations.
121
Again, firms are not shy about this fact.

115

See id.
See id.
117
See Mullins & Scannell, supra note 3 (interviewing Clint Carlson, who runs a
$3 billion hedge fund, Carlson Capital, L.P., that hires Washington lawyers to provide political intelligence).
118
For example, one firm advertises that
116

[t]hrough our pioneering Information Capital & Political Intelligence Practice, our team provides insight, analysis, and evaluation that separates rhetoric
from reality . . . for [those] involved in the public and private equity markets.
By knowing the legislative and political “pulse” in the nation’s capital and in
statehouses throughout the country, we present clients with valuable, insightful information so they can make prudent decisions in advance of the
traditional news cycle.
Pub. Law & Policy Strategies, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, Core Competencies: Information Capital & Political Intelligence, http://www.sonnenschein.com/
practice_areas/plps/corecomps/cc3/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
119
See Pub. Law & Policy Strategies, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, supra
note 15.
120
Snyder, supra note 9 (quoting Elliott Portnoy of Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP).
121
See, e.g., Pub. Law & Policy Strategies, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP,
supra note 15 (“[O]ur considerable network of federal and state political experts and
relationships with key elected officials[] afford us a unique ability to decipher reality
from rhetoric.”).
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2. Current Laws Affecting Political-Intelligence Gathering
The LDA requires individuals to publicly disclose the clients on
whose behalf they lobby in quarterly reports filed with the Secretary of
122
the Senate and Clerk of the House of Representatives. Reports must
include, in addition to other information, the name of the client, lobbying firm, and lobbyist; lists of activities, employees, and interests of
foreign entities for each general substantive issue lobbied; and the
approximate income received from the client (rounded to the nearest
123
$10,000 if in excess of $5000).
An individual is required to register and report within forty-five
days after she has made a lobbying contact or has been hired to make
124
a lobbying contact.
A “lobbying contact” is defined as an oral or
written communication to a covered executive or legislative branch
official that concerns (1) “the formulation, modification, or adoption”
of federal legislation, rules, regulations, executive orders, programs,
policies, or positions; (2) “the administration or execution” of federal
policies or programs; or (3) “the nomination or confirmation” of an
125
individual subject to Senate confirmation.
Although an inquiry made on behalf of political-intelligence
clients pertains to the “formulation, modification, or adoption” of leg126
islation, it is exempt as an “administrative request.”
Since politicalintelligence gatherers are not actively seeking to “influence” legisla127
tion, the LDA does not apply.
No other laws appear to specifically
regulate political-intelligence activities.

122

2 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2006 & Supp. I 2009).
Id. § 1604(b)–(c).
124
Id. § 1603(a)(1). The definition of “lobbyist” exempts individuals “whose lobbying activities constitute less than 20 percent of the time engaged in the services provided by such individual to that client over a 3-month period.” Id. § 1602(10).
125
Id. § 1602(8)(A).
126
See id. § 1602(8)(B)(v) (exempting “a request for a meeting, a request for the
status of an action, or any other similar administrative request, if the request does not
include an attempt to influence a covered executive branch official or a covered legislative branch official”); SENATE OFFICE OF PUB. RECORDS & LEGISLATIVE RES. CTR.,
LOBBYING DISCLOSURE ACT GUIDANCE 7 (2009) [hereinafter LDA GUIDANCE], available
at http://www.senate.gov/legislative/resources/pdf/S1guidance.pdf (“If a communication is limited to routine information-gathering questions and there is not an attempt to influence a covered official, the exception of Section 3(8)(B)(v) for ‘any other similar administrative request’ would normally apply.”); see also Snyder, supra note 9
(“Because they aren’t, in fact, lobbying for these clients, firms don’t have to register
with the Senate or the House.”).
127
See LDA GUIDANCE, supra note 126, at 7.
123
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II. ANALYSIS UNDER THE CURRENT FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
The previous Part concluded that ethics laws do not adequately
prohibit government insiders or outside actors from trading on material nonpublic political information. This Part considers whether
the current federal securities laws cover these trading activities. This
question is important because inside traders face criminal punishment
128
and significant civil sanctions.
For government insiders, this prospect is certainly much more severe than breaching Congressional ethics rules, which in the Senate do not cover trading on inside informa129
tion and in the House are unenforced. Even still, breaches of ethics
laws typically provide only for remedial action (reprimand or, at most,
130
For outside actors—who are not
removal) and nominal civil fines.
precluded from trading on political intelligence under any other laws
and are not even required to disclose these activities—insider trading
liability would certainly be a deal breaker.
A. Current Law and Doctrine
Insider trading is commonly defined as “the purchase or sale of
131
securities on the basis of material non-public information.” Modern
128

Those convicted of insider trading face fines of up to $5 million and prison
sentences of up to twenty years, but “no person shall be subject to imprisonment . . . for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78ff(a) (2006). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 increased maximum fines from $1
million and maximum prison sentences from ten years. Pub. L. No. 107-204, sec. 1106,
§ 32(a), 116 Stat. 745, 810.
129
See supra subsection I.A.2.
130
See HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 69, at 3 (describing penalties for violations of House ethics rules as including “censure, reprimand, condemnation, reduction of seniority, fine, or other sanction determined to be appropriate,” and noting
that in some situations, where the ethics rules “derive from criminal law,” such violations “may lead to a fine or imprisonment, or both”); SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra
note 71, at 4 (“Upon completion of its investigative process, the Committee may recommend . . . an appropriate sanction for a violation or improper conduct, including,
for Senators, censure, expulsion, or party discipline and, for staff members, termination of employment.”). In practice, expulsion and censure have been the most serious
punishments imposed upon members violating ethical responsibilities. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL RULES OF CONDUCT 6
(2008) (reviewing various expulsion and censure cases and describing expulsion as the
“most serious punishment”).
131
C. EDWARD FLETCHER, MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSIDER TRADING 3 (1991)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also NASSER ARSHADI & THOMAS H. EYSSELL,
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE INSIDER TRADING 1 (1993) (“We define insider
trading as transactions in the shares of publicly held corporations using material nonpublic information.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Law and Economics of Insider
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federal insider trading law is statutorily rooted in section 10(b) of the
132
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). Yet, nothing
in section 10(b) of the Exchange Act explicitly mentions insider trading. Rather, section 10(b) was considered “a catchall intended to capture various types of securities fraud not expressly covered by more
133
specific provisions of the Exchange Act.” Congress intended for sec134
tion 16 of the Exchange Act to be the statutory basis for preventing
insider trading, whereas “section 10 . . . was not thought by Congress
135
in 1934 to be an anti-insider trading section.”
The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 in 1942 pursuant to section
136
10(b) of the Exchange Act.
Like the Exchange Act, the Rule does
Trading: A Comprehensive Primer 3 (2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=261277 (“Generally speaking, insider trading is trading in
securities while in possession of material nonpublic information.”).
132
15 U.S.C. § 78j. The relevant portion of section 10 provides that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange—
....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
133

Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 10.
Section 16 of the Exchange Act is a categorical prohibition on short-swing trading by corporate insiders. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). It provides that each officer, director,
or ten-percent beneficial owner of a corporate security covered by the Exchange Act
must file certain disclosures with the SEC and is precluded from realizing profit, which
“inures” to the issuer, on the sale of any corporate security within six months of its
purchase. Id. § 78p(a)–(b); see also Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 10-11.
135
FLETCHER, supra note 131, at 45.
136
See Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 11. The Rule provides as follows:
134

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
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not mention insider trading. It was not until 1961 that the SEC found
insider trading on an impersonal stock exchange to violate Rule 10b137
5, and “[o]nly then did the modern federal insider trading prohibi138
tion at last begin to take shape.”
Despite section 10(b)’s inauspicious statutory roots, judicial interpretation and SEC application have
expanded section 10(b) into the broad antifraud provision that it is
today, notwithstanding some judicial and administrative decisions that
139
have narrowed its application.
Several insider trading theories have been recognized under section 10(b). These include (1) classic insider trading liability, under
which an insider breaches a fiduciary duty that she directly owes to the
corporation and its shareholders; (2) tipper/tippee liability, under
which a tippee trades on information gained from a fiduciary tipper
and inherits the tipper’s fiduciary duty; and (3) misappropriation liability, under which an individual trades on information in violation of
a fiduciary duty or a duty of trust or confidence owed to the source of
the information.
The SEC has provided its interpretation of these three theories in
Rule 10b5-1, which provides that
[t]he “manipulative and deceptive devices” prohibited by Section 10(b)
of the Act [and Rule 10b-5] . . . include, among other things, the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic
information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security
or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of
140
the material nonpublic information.

The rest of this Section briefly discusses each basis of liability and then
applies each in the context of trading on political intelligence.

137

See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 908-09, 911 (1961) (holding that a broker who obtained nonpublic information about a company’s dividend action and who
entered sale orders before the information became public had violated Rule 10b-5).
138
Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 12.
139
See FLETCHER, supra note 131, at 99 (describing the evolution of Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence). Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist opined that Rule 10b-5
is “a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.” Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
140
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a) (emphasis added). The regulation, however, specifically notes that “[t]he law of insider trading is otherwise defined by judicial opinions
construing Rule 10b-5, and Rule 10b5-1 does not modify the scope of insider trading
law in any other respect.” Id. preliminary note.
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1. Classic Insider Trading: The Disclose-or-Abstain Rule
The classic case of insider trading occurs when a corporate insider
buys or sells shares of her company while possessing material nonpublic
information acquired through her corporate insider position. Originally, the concept was applied broadly and required anyone with “access,
141
directly or indirectly,” to material nonpublic information to “disclose
142
or abstain” from trading using the information. It was not long, however, before the Supreme Court cabined the disclose-or-abstain rule by
limiting it to corporate fiduciaries who possess material nonpublic information. A duty to disclose or abstain from trading arises only where
there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties involved, namely,
143
Rule 10b-5 does
the individual trader and the issuer of the security.
141
142

Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
The SEC established the disclose-or-abstain rule in Cady, Roberts:

We, and the courts have consistently held that insiders must disclose material
facts which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not
known to persons with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their
investment judgment. Failure to make disclosure in these circumstances constitutes a violation of the anti-fraud provisions. If, on the other hand, disclosure
prior to effecting a purchase or sale would be improper or unrealistic under the
circumstances, we believe the alternative is to forego the transaction.
Id. at 911 (footnote omitted).
The first “truly seminal insider trading case[]” was SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
decided by the Second Circuit in 1968. See Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 13 (commenting on SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc)).
Texas Gulf Sulphur involved corporate insiders who bought stock or call options in the
Texas Gulf Sulphur Company (TGS) from the fall of 1963 through the spring of 1964.
401 F.2d at 839. During this time, TGS exploration teams discovered substantial zinc
and copper deposits under a parcel of land, the rights to which TGS eventually purchased. Id. at 843-44. TGS denied rumors of the discovery until eventually announcing the find in April 1964, id. at 844-45, and by May, TGS stock was trading at prices
222% above its share price several months earlier, Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 13.
The Second Circuit upheld the convictions of certain TGS insiders under Rule 10b-5,
401 F.2d at 852, reasoning that insiders who possess material nonpublic information
must disclose the information or abstain from trading altogether, id. at 848.
143
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (holding that “the element required to make silence fraudulent—a duty to disclose—[was] absent in this
case” because the petitioner “was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence”). In Chiarella, Vincent Chiarella, an employee of a financial printer, learned of an upcoming tender offer while preparing the
tender offer materials. Id. at 224. Chiarella purchased shares in the target company
and later sold them for a substantial profit. Id. He was convicted of violating Rule 10b5. Id. at 222. The Second Circuit applied Texas Gulf Sulphur to uphold his conviction,
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), but the Supreme Court
reversed, 445 U.S. at 231-35, 237. See also ARSHADI & EYSSELL, supra note 131, at 52
(“This ruling required that to impose the disclose or abstain rule, the trader must be a
fiduciary to the firm and consequently to its shareholders.”).
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144

not create liability for nondisclosure “absent a duty to speak.” Accordingly, a cognizable insider trading claim under the classic theory can
be sustained only if the defendant trades on material nonpublic information in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the security’s issuer.
2. Tipper/Tippee Liability
Courts have extended Rule 10b-5 to provide liability for an individual who is not a fiduciary but who trades on a tip from an individual who is a fiduciary. In this situation, the “tippee” inherits the fiduciary duty of the “tipper” when the tipper has received a personal
145
benefit from passing on the tip.
This is because a tippee assumes
the liability of the tipper by participating in the “insider’s breach of a
146
147
fiduciary duty.” The tippee’s liability is “derivative.” Accordingly,
a tippee is “liable only when the tipper breached a fiduciary duty by
disclosing information to the tippee, and the tippee knows or has rea148
son to know of the breach of duty.” Further, the duty is inheritable
only when the tipper received a gift, pecuniary gain, or reputational
149
enhancement. The term “reputational enhancement” is broad and
150
can include merely a “warm glow” from helping a friend.
144

Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661-62 (1983) (“In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or abstain, it thus is necessary to determine
whether the insider’s ‘tip’ constituted a breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty. . . . [T]he test is whether the insider personally will benefit . . . from his disclosure.”). Raymond Dirks was an investment analyst who, on the tip of a former officer
of Equity Funding of America, uncovered substantial fraud at the company. Id. at 64849. Dirks shared his discovery with the Wall Street Journal and his clients. Id. at 649-50.
Some of Dirks’s clients sold their holdings in Equity Funding and avoided substantial
losses that would have occurred if they had held their securities until the news became
public. Id. at 649. The Court held that Dirks did not violate Rule 10b-5 because the
corporate insiders did not share information with Dirks for the purpose of gaining a
personal advantage. Id. at 662, 665, 667. Consequently, the Court overturned Dirks’s
conviction. Id. at 667.
146
Id. at 659 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12).
147
Id.
148
Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 19; see also Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660 (“Thus, a tippee
assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material
nonpublic information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or
should know that there has been a breach.”).
149
See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64 (noting that the determination of whether “there has
been a breach of duty by the insider . . . requires courts to focus on objective criteria, i. e.,
whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure,
such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings. . . . The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also
145
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3. Misappropriation Theory
The misappropriation theory was developed to fill a void created
by the fiduciary requirement imputed to the classic insider trading
151
theory, and it has been used to reach outsider trading.
The Su152
The
preme Court adopted the misappropriation theory in 1997.
theory creates insider trading liability for outsiders who trade on material nonpublic information in breach of a “duty of trust or confi153
In essence,
dence” owed to the inside source of the information.
even if a trader does not owe a duty to the issuer of the security in
which he trades, he may still be liable if he is in a position of confidence with the information’s source.
The SEC’s interpretation of the misappropriation theory is pro154
vided in Rule 10b5-2.
The Rule applies to any violation under the
Act or Rule 10b-5 “that is based on the purchase or sale of securities
on the basis of, or the communication of, material nonpublic infor155
Rule
mation misappropriated in breach of a duty of trust or confidence.”
10b5-2 provides that a “duty of trust or confidence” will be inferred
exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or
friend.” (citation omitted)); Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 19 (explaining that “nonpecuniary gain,” such as a boost to one’s reputation, could create a personal benefit).
150
See ARSHADI & EYSSELL, supra note 131, at 53.
151
The SEC pushed the misappropriation theory following setbacks in Chiarella
and Dirks, decisions that were seen as having too greatly limited SEC authority to effectively curb insider trading. Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 22.
152
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653-54 (1997). James O’Hagan was a
partner at the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney, which had been hired by Grand Metropolitan PLC with respect to a planned tender offer for shares of the Pillsbury Company. Id. at 647. O’Hagan, who was not working on the deal but knew of its details, purchased stock and call options in the target company, Pillsbury. Id. Following the
announcement of the tender offer, O’Hagan sold his shares and options, reaping a
“profit of more than $4.3 million.” Id. at 648. O’Hagan was not subject to liability under the classic insider trading theory because his firm was employed by the bidder, and
O’Hagan took positions in the target. Id. at 653 n.5. The Court recognized that
O’Hagan owed no duty to the target company in which he traded, yet “it grounded
liability under the misappropriation theory on deception of the source of the information.” Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 30. O’Hagan, a fiduciary of his law firm, failed to
disclose his use of information that belonged to the firm. Cf. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655
n.6. O’Hagan’s conduct, as a result, was sufficient to constitute a violation of Rule 10b5. Id. at 666.
153
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653; see also id. at 652 (“[A] fiduciary’s undisclosed, selfserving use of a principal’s information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a
duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that
information.”).
154
The SEC is careful to note that the Rule does not displace judicially created
doctrine. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 preliminary note (2009).
155
Id. § 240.10b5-2(a) (emphasis added).

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

1482

[Vol. 158: 1451

when (1) there is an agreement to “maintain information in confidence”; (2) where the parties communicating such information have a
“history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences” so as to create a
reasonable inference “that the recipient will maintain confidentiality”;
or (3) information is received from a “spouse, parent, child, or sibl156
ing,” although this presumption can be rebutted.
Nevertheless, in a recent high-profile case, a U.S. District Court re157
jected such an understanding of Rule 10b5-2.
While the Court affirmed that the misappropriation theory does not require a fiduciary
158
duty, as is the case under the classic insider trading theory, it held
that a duty of confidentiality does not imply a duty not to trade in a
security. Rather, when confidential communications are made, there
must not merely be an agreement to keep the information confiden159
tial but also an explicit agreement not to trade on the information.

156

Id. § 240.10b5-2(b). In full, subsection (b) reads as follows:

(b) Enumerated “duties of trust or confidence.” For purposes of this section, a “duty of trust or confidence” exists in the following circumstances, among others:
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence;
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information
and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of
sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or reasonably should know that the person communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or
(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information
from his or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person
receiving or obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust
or confidence existed with respect to the information, by establishing that he
or she neither knew nor reasonably should have known that the person who
was the source of the information expected that the person would keep the
information confidential, because of the parties’ history, pattern, or practice
of sharing and maintaining confidences, and because there was no agreement
or understanding to maintain the confidentiality of the information.
Id. (emphasis added).
157
See SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 730-31 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (“To permit
liability based on Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) would exceed the SEC’s § 10(b) authority to proscribe conduct that is deceptive.”).
158
See id. at 726 (“[T]he court disagrees with his contention that, for a person to be
held liable under the misappropriation theory, he must enter into an agreement that
creates a relationship bearing all the hallmarks of a traditional fiduciary relationship.”).
159
See id. at 725 (“The agreement, however, must consist of more than an express
or implied promise merely to keep information confidential. . . . He must agree to
maintain the confidentiality of the information and not to trade on or otherwise use it.
Absent a duty not to use the information for personal benefit, there is no deception in
doing so.”).
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B. Application to Political Intelligence
Having briefly summarized the bases of insider trading liability,
the remainder of this Part considers whether any are relevant to trading on political intelligence. This Section concludes that current law
does not support holding government insiders or outside actors liable
for insider trading without substantially manipulating current doctrine. First, government insiders, even if deemed “fiduciaries,” are not
fiduciaries of the issuer of the securities in which they trade and cannot be liable under the classic theory. The misappropriation theory is
tenuous absent an explicitly recognized duty of confidentiality among
members of Congress. Second, outside actors are not liable under the
tipper/tippee theory because government insiders—the “tippers”—
are not fiduciaries of a security issuer. Neither are outside actors liable under the misappropriation theory absent an explicit agreement
of confidentiality because the very nature of lobbying implies that political information will be passed along to clients.
1. Government Insiders
Several scholars, commentators, and politicians have argued that
the insider trading doctrine outlined above does not capture trading
160
on political information by government insiders. Yet, others believe
it is covered by the current doctrine, either under the theory of classic
161
162
insider trading or the misappropriation theory.

160

See, e.g., Barbabella, Cohen, Kardon & Molk, supra note 24, at 200 (arguing that
although trading on political intelligence “presents some obvious analogues to corporate
insider trading,” nevertheless “under current law, none of these described actions is illegal”); Brody Mullins, Bill Seeks to Ban Insider Trading by Lawmakers and Their Aides, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 28, 2006, at A1 (quoting Thomas Newkirk, a former official in the Division of Enforcement at the SEC, as saying that “[i]f a congressman learns that his committee is
about to do something that would affect a company, he can go trade on that because he
is not obligated to keep that information confidential . . . . He is not breaching a duty of
confidentiality to anybody and therefore he would not be liable for insider trading.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Press Release, Baird, supra note 2 (“Under current law,
Members of Congress and their staff do not owe a duty of confidentiality to Congress,
and therefore are not liable for insider trading.”); Stephen Bainbridge, Insiders on the Hill,
TCSDAILY, Mar. 30, 2006, http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=033006D (“Effective
regulation of problematic Congressional trading thus requires a broader prohibition
than the securities law definition of insider trading.”).
161
See Langevoort, supra note 23, at 34-35 (positing that government officials trading on political insider information breach a fiduciary duty owed to citizen investors).
162
See George, supra note 23, at 166 (arguing that Senate and House ethical codes
create a reasonable expectation of confidentiality).
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First, Professor Langevoort argues that the classic theory of insider
163
trading sufficiently covers government insiders. Professor Langevoort
contends that when a politician possesses “information that will substantially affect the price of an issuer’s securities” and then trades on such
information, he is breaching a “duty of fair dealing” to the “country’s
164
Professor Langevoort and
citizens” in contravention of Rule 10b-5.
others acknowledge that government insiders do not owe a fiduciary
duty to the issuing corporation of the stock in which they trade but that
an equivalent duty owed to the public suffices under the Chiarella fiduciary duty requirement. Professor Langevoort explains that,
[l]ike the corporate insider, the government official has an advantageous position as compared to the persons whom he is charged with
serving. Thus, the principle of preventing unjust enrichment applies as
well in the case of a government official. It follows that he should give
up any trading profit coming to him because of his fiduciary position
165
when other investors are harmed by the unavailability of information.

A number of courts have similarly found that elected officials owe du166
These courts
ties akin to fiduciary obligations to their constituents.
have not held that the duties owed by public officials are the same as fiduciary duties in the traditional corporate context, but they simply
167
make the argument by analogy. Yet, to the extent that Congress con-

163

A decade prior to Professor Langevoort’s article, a law student argued that government insiders are liable for trading on political information. See Krimmel, supra
note 21, at 1492 (proposing that government insiders violate Rule 10b-5 when they use
confidential information to purchase securities for their own benefit).
164
Langevoort, supra note 23, at 34; see also Krimmel, supra note 21, at 1503
(“While a government employee bears no traditional or special fiduciary obligation as
such to the shareholders of any specific corporation, he certainly owes a duty to the
government, and eventually therefore to the public at large, for the proper performance of his responsibilities.”).
165
Langevoort, supra note 23, at 34-35.
166
See, e.g., United States v. Woodard, 459 F.3d 1078, 1086 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[A]
public official . . . owe[s] a fiduciary duty to the public to make governmental decisions
in the public’s best interest . . . .” (footnote omitted)); United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d
534, 545 (7th Cir. 1975) (“[I]t was clearly improper and therefore actionable under
the mail fraud statute for the defendant to make use of inside advance information
obtained by virtue of his official position for his own personal gain.”); United States v.
Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 1970) (“Public confidence essential to the effective functioning of government would be seriously impaired by any arrangement that would
enable a few individuals to profit from advance knowledge of governmental action.”).
167
See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, A Tale of Two Instruments: Insider
Trading in Non-Equity Securities, 49 BUS. LAW. 187, 245 (1993) (“Several courts and
commentators analogized the government employee’s relationship with taxpayers as
akin to that of fiduciary to beneficiary.”).
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templated insider trading prior to the enactment of the Exchange Act,
168
it did so only with regard to corporate fiduciaries in a limited sense.
Nonetheless, Professor Langevoort’s application seems to miss the
major limitation imposed by Chiarella, namely that trading on material
nonpublic information only violates Rule 10b-5 where the trader owes
a fiduciary duty to the corporate issuer of the security. In this regard,
it is irrelevant whether government insiders are fiduciaries of the public at large. Without a fiduciary duty owed to the issuer, a government
insider would not be liable under the classic theory of insider trading.
A second argument advanced is that government insiders are lia169
ble under the misappropriation theory.
This argument maintains
that members of Congress and Capitol Hill staffers are bound by a du170
ty of confidentiality laid out in the Code of Ethics, discussed earlier.
For example, Senate Rule 29(5) provides expulsion or punishment for
any “Senator, officer, or employee of the Senate who shall disclose the
171
Acsecret or confidential business or proceedings of the Senate.”
cordingly, it is argued that these contractual provisions are sufficient
to create a duty of “trust or confidence” under Rule 10b5-2 that is
breached when members misappropriate information for trading
172
Likewise, Professor Bainbridge agrees that congressional
purposes.
ethics limitations “should suffice” to establish the requisite trust and
173
confidence under the misappropriation theory.

168

See S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 55 (1934) (“Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the subcommittee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers of corporations who used their positions of
trust and the confidential information which came to them in such positions, to aid
them in their market activities.”).
169
See George, supra note 23, at 163 (arguing that the misappropriation theory is
viable because legislators and their staffers possess a duty of confidentiality and because congressional information is not always public). In addition, George argues that
staffers breach fiduciary duties owed to their legislator-employers arising out of the
principal/agent relationship. See id. at 165-66 (asserting that staffers who relay political
intelligence “breach traditional fiduciary duties arising out of principal/agent relationships with the legislators or with higher ranking staffers who are their employers” and
“almost certainly break duties arising out of ethical rules as well as duties arising from
history, pattern, or practice”).
170
See id. at 166 (concluding that Paragraph Eight of the Code of Ethics for Government Service creates a “duty-by-agreement . . . because it is binding upon all members of the Federal Government as a condition of employment.”).
171
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, R. XXIX(5), as reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 110-9,
at 42 (2007).
172
George, supra note 23, at 166.
173
Bainbridge, supra note 24, at 9.
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174

Other scholars dismiss both theories.
Although they acknowledge a consensus that “congressional representatives ought to place
public interests first,” a lack of a “concrete duty” has prevented en175
Accordingly, “[i]f congresforcement actions under current law.
sional representatives and others are to be barred from engaging in
such activities, regulation appears necessary insofar as it overcomes
176
legislators’ lack of a well-defined duty.”
These arguments are correct in stating that, at a minimum, there
is a lack of consensus and understanding among members of Congress about the duties of trust and confidence owed. This is evidenced by the fact that members themselves have introduced legislation to clarify the extent of their duties with regard to insider trading
rather than calling upon the SEC to enforce under the current re177
gime.
When the Supreme Court endorsed the misappropriation
theory, it was in the context of a clearly understood and well-defined
178
duty owed by an employee to his employer. If the misappropriation
theory is enforced absent a concrete duty, there will be virtually no
179
limit to swallowing up unwary confidants. This certainly should not
be the goal of the misappropriation theory.
Perhaps the best argument that government insiders are liable
under the misappropriation theory stems not from a duty of trust or
confidence based upon House or Senate ethics rules, but instead
upon fiduciary duties stemming from the government insiders’ employment relationship. Professor Bainbridge makes this argument
with regard to Capitol Hill staff (employees) who he claims have fiduciary duties to the members of Congress for whom they work (em180
ployers).
Under the misappropriation theory, a congressional employee has a duty not to trade on information acquired from her
174

See Barbabella, Cohen, Kardon & Molk, supra note 24, at 215-17 (arguing that
no theory of insider trading applies to trading on nonpublic material information obtained by members of Congress by virtue of their office).
175
Id. at 217.
176
Id.
177
See infra Section III.A.
178
See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997) (finding misappropriation
where “O’Hagan, in breach of a duty of trust and confidence he owed to his law firm,
Dorsey & Whitney, and to its client, Grand Met, traded on the basis of nonpublic information regarding Grand Met’s planned tender offer for Pillsbury common stock”).
179
SEC v. Cuban prevents this by requiring not merely an agreement of confidentiality but also an agreement not to trade. 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 725 (N.D. Tex. 2009).
180
See Bainbridge, supra note 24, at 9 (“These employment relationships should
suffice for Congressional staffers to be deemed to have an agency or other relationship
of trust and confidence with their employing agency.”).
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181

employer, a member of Congress. Professor Bainbridge argues that
this employment relationship is sufficient to sustain liability for employee staff members but not for members of Congress—the employ182
ers. This approach fails to appreciate the potential reach of the argument, however, because members of Congress, like their staff, could
also be deemed employees of the federal government. Accordingly, a
better approach would not distinguish between congressional staff
and elected members of Congress but would instead classify both
groups as “employees” of the federal government, each owing fidu183
Under this
ciary duties to its “employer,” the federal government.
characterization, it is difficult to distinguish misappropriation of political information by government insiders (politicians and staff alike)
from misappropriation of information from one’s employer in the
traditional misappropriation cases.
Against this approach, however, is an intuition in favor of treating
a member of Congress as her own boss—and hence, as an “employer”—and against treating members of Congress as “employees” of the
federal government. This is true not only of Professor Bainbridge’s
184
argument, but it is apparent in other contexts as well.
On the one
hand, members of Congress receive a paycheck from the federal government. On the other hand, there is a sense that members of Congress are not like employees because their public election gives them
autonomy to make decisions as they see fit without being accountable
to anyone but their constituency (and to that extent, only in subsequent elections). Furthermore, unlike employees, members of Congress are not in a clear principal/agent relationship with the federal
government and, accordingly, are not accountable to the federal government as are typical “employees.” These observations suggest that
members of Congress are only “employees” because they formally receive a paycheck from the federal government while they functionally
behave more like employers.
There is no consensus as to whether politicians are “employees” or
“employers.” Similar to the disagreement over the question whether
181

See id. at 10 (“Put into O’Hagan’s terminology, ‘a [staffer’s] undisclosed, self
serving use of [Congressional] information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a
duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the [Congress].’” (alterations in original)
(quoting O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652)).
182
See id. at 12 (“As an employer, a member of Congress is free to trade; as an employee, the staffer is not.”).
183
I credit Professor Tyson for developing this argument.
184
See, e.g., infra note 237 and accompanying text (suggesting that members of
Parliament in the United Kingdom are not fiduciaries of the British Government).
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members of Congress and their staff are bound by a duty of trust or
confidence sufficient to give rise to liability under the misappropriation theory, there is also disagreement over whether members of
Congress are “employees” who could satisfy the misappropriation
theory. This confusion suggests that regardless of one’s view of the
status of government insiders, it would be controversial to apply insider trading doctrine in this situation, to say the least. It would be unwise to extend insider trading liability where its application is tenuous,
as would be the case under either misappropriation approach.
2. Outside Actors
Outside actors—lobbyists and hedge funds—present a different set
of issues that makes them even less likely to be considered inside traders
under current doctrine. First, classic insider trading theory is inapplicable unless the outside actor owes a fiduciary duty to the issuer of the
185
security in which he trades.
For example, the classic theory would
apply if corporate executives hired a lobbyist and then traded in their
own companies’ securities based on the political information acquired.
However, this situation is unlikely because the political-intelligence
practice is dominated by hedge fund clients who do not have fiduciary
relationships with the issuers of the stock in which they trade.
Second, tipper/tippee liability will depend entirely on whether
the government insider—the tipper—is a fiduciary not merely to the
public at large, but specifically to the issuer of the security. Assuming
arguendo that government insiders are fiduciaries, outside actors
would inherit the fiduciary duty of the insider only if the insider were
186
to breach her duty. An insider breaches her duty only if she receives
some sort of personal benefit in exchange for the inside informa187
tion, and courts have interpreted what constitutes a personal benefit

185
186

See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court stated in Dirks that

some tippees must assume an insider’s duty to the shareholders not because
they receive inside information, but rather because it has been made available
to them improperly . . . when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows
or should know that there has been a breach.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
187
See id. at 662 (“Thus, the test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no
breach of duty to stockholders.”).
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188

very broadly.
The best argument for finding liability here is that
government insiders pass along information to their K Street chums
for a political contribution, reputational advantage, “warm glow” effect, or expectation of future employment. There certainly is a “re189
volving door” between K Street and Capitol Hill. A “personal benefit” analysis would require a fact-intensive, case-by-case inquiry into the
relationships between government insiders and lobbyists and would
somehow have to measure fuzzy reputational advantages or determine
future employment opportunities. All this is, however, moot, since
the tipper/tippee theory will not apply even if a benefit can be construed. The government insider must have a fiduciary relationship
with the issuer of the security in which the tippee trades, not merely
190
with the general public.
Third, the misappropriation theory presents a more viable application to outside actors. Since the misappropriation theory severs the fiduciary requirement between trader and issuer, we can simply look at
whether the outside actor has breached a duty of confidentiality with
the government insider. As we saw, Rule 10b5-2 provides a nonexclusive definition of the duty of trust and confidence. Such a duty may
arise explicitly through an agreement or through a “history, pattern, or
191
practice of sharing confidences.” For instance, in the asbestos example, there was an indication that the information was to be kept confidential: when the information was relayed to the press, its release was
conditioned upon the information not being published until the morn192
ing of the official announcement. If the same condition were placed
upon the communication to the lobbyist, then there arguably would be
193
an agreement “to maintain information in confidence.”
One could also argue that there is a pattern of sharing confidences
between lobbyists and government insiders that establishes a general

188

See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
See Gail Russell Chaddock, Republicans Take over K Street, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 29, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WLNR 2280355 (quoting Frank Clemente,
director of Public Citizen’s Congress Project, as saying that “[t]he revolving door is becoming more comfortably established and institutionalized”).
190
I have other concerns with pursuing this approach under tipper/tippee liability. Specifically, imposing the vague contours of tipper/tippee liability would limit constructive exchanges between Capitol Hill and constituent groups, often represented by
lobbyists, because it may be impossible to determine ex ante whether liability would
arise. I consider this further in Part V.
191
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(2) (2009).
192
See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
193
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1).
189
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duty of confidentiality. Lobbying, however, by its very nature contradicts this argument. Government insiders know that lobbyists always
represent someone—that lobbyists are mere liaisons between Capitol
Hill and the constituent group—and they presume that the discussions
will be relayed back. It would be unlikely that the lobbyist would not
share the information absent an explicit agreement not to do so.
Application of the misappropriation theory could be further
complicated by the holding in SEC v. Cuban that there must also be an
194
explicit agreement not to trade using the confidential information.
The court acknowledged that “nondisclosure and non-use are logically
195
This requirement seems to suggest that the lobbyist himdistinct.”
self could trade on acquired information unless he agreed not to do
so. The lobbyist, however, would breach confidentiality by sharing information with a client regardless of whether the lobbyist agreed not
to trade. This is unlikely to be an issue since lobbyists, in practice,
pass political intelligence along to their clients. If, however, a constituent receives political intelligence directly from Capitol Hill, and she
196
is able to maintain confidentiality while trading, an explicit agree197
ment not to trade would be required under the court’s test.
3. Conclusion
Though insider trading liability could arguably exist for government insiders and outside actors, such an expansive reading would
have profound consequences for current insider trading doctrine.
First, as it pertains to government insiders, the classic theory is inapplicable because it requires a fiduciary relationship between the party
trading and the issuer of the security being traded. Accordingly, even
assuming that government insiders have a fiduciary relationship with
the public at large, that fiduciary relationship would be insufficient
because it is not with the issuer of the security being traded. This assumption is heroic because, at most, courts have analogized public
figures to fiduciaries but have not explicitly named them as such.
Second, the misappropriation theory is more tenable, but holding
public officials and employees liable would require either inferring a
duty of trust or confidence arising from their public service or classify-

194

See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 725 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (footnote omitted).
196
See id. (“A person who receives material, nonpublic information may in fact preserve
the confidentiality of that information while simultaneously using it for his own gain.”).
197
See supra note 159.
195
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ing public officials as “employees” of the federal government. It is
clear that there is no consensus regarding such a duty or employment
status, as demonstrated by the fact that members of Congress themselves are sponsoring legislation that would clarify the issue rather
than relying on current law. Pursuing government insiders under any
of these theories would require stretching current doctrine beyond
what it can legitimately sustain.
With regard to outside actors, insider trading liability is even more
attenuated. First, tipper/tippee liability suffers the same fate as the
classic theory for government insiders, since a tippee’s liability depends on the tipper having a fiduciary relationship with the issuer.
Second, the misappropriation theory may apply if there is an explicit
understanding of confidentiality. In practice, however, this will seldom be the case, since it is the lobbyist’s job to share political information with her clients.
Lastly, one should be concerned that such convoluted and indeterminate application of the federal securities laws to democratic
processes may severely hamper political dialogue as well as market efficiency. Part V explores these ramifications further, but for now it
will suffice to make a few preliminary comments. First, fear of criminal liability for insider trading will make government insiders think
twice before meeting and sharing information with constituents.
These exchanges of ideas and information between Capitol Hill and
the American public are invaluable to building consensus, writing informed legislation, and preventing congressional insularity. Second,
market efficiency depends on delivering accurate information to the
marketplace, information that is then impounded into asset prices.
Information gatherers—such as market analysts or, here, lobbyists
hired by hedge funds—perform the valuable service of ferreting out
information that will eventually be reflected in accurate and efficient
198
market prices. One should not lose sight of the unintended consequences resulting from applying insider trading doctrine to politicalintelligence trading.
III. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN THE U.S. CONGRESS AND COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF U.K. INSIDER TRADING LAW
Part II concluded that current insider trading doctrine does not
sufficiently support liability for trading on political information. This
Part considers recent legislation introduced in the U.S. Congress
198

I am grateful to Professor Fisch for calling this argument to my attention.
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aimed at remedying this “loophole.” It then turns to a comparative
analysis of the insider trading law of the United Kingdom, which does
prohibit government officials and outsiders from trading on political
information. This Part concludes that the U.K. law is not instructive
because of significant differences between U.K. and U.S. insider trading law and policy objectives.
A. Recent Legislative Proposals Considered by the U.S. Congress
The 2005 media attention surrounding the growing practice of
political-intelligence gathering caught the attention of two Democrat199
ic members of the House of Representatives. Representative Louise
Slaughter of New York, chairwoman of the House Rules Committee,
and Representative Brian Baird of Washington have introduced legislation in recent Congresses that would bring trading based on political intelligence—by government insiders and outside actors—under
the umbrella of the federal securities laws. The legislation would also
require lobbyists to disclose their political intelligence clients. But the
legislation has proven politically unpalatable. As outlined below, after
introducing broad legislation in 2006 and 2007, separate legislation
was introduced in 2008 that only sought to require disclosure of political-intelligence activities. In 2009, Representatives Baird and Slaughter reintroduced the more comprehensive legislative proposal. The
current economic and political climate has evidenced an appetite for
financial regulation, and, in 2009, the legislation received its first congressional hearing.
1. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act
Representatives Baird and Slaughter introduced variations of the
Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act (STOCK Act) in the
200
201
202
109th, 110th, and 111th Congresses. The STOCK Acts of the 110th
199

See Press Release, Baird, supra note 15; see also Macey, supra note 46, at 309 (“In
response to the ‘shocking’ news of public officials using their official positions for personal gain, Louise Slaughter, the chair of the House Rules Committee (D-NY) and
Brian Baird (D-WA) proposed the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act.”).
200
Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 5015, 109th Cong. (2006);
see also Press Release, Congressman Brian Baird, Baird, Slaughter Seek Capitol Hill Insider Trading Ban (Mar. 28, 2006), available at http://www.house.gov/list/press/
wa03_baird/STOCKAct032806.html (announcing the introduction of legislation by Representatives Baird and Slaughter to “stop insider trading on Capitol Hill”).
201
Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 2341, 110th Cong.
(2007); see also Press Release, Baird, supra note 2 (announcing the reintroduction of
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and 111th Congress were identical. A few changes were made between
the 109th and the 110th versions that likely signify political compromise.
First, the STOCK Act seeks “[t]o prohibit securities trading based
203
on nonpublic information relating to Congress.”
The legislation
would accomplish this by amending the Exchange Act to require the
SEC to promulgate a rule prohibiting trading on material nonpublic
information relating to legislation if the information was (1) “obtained
by reason of such person being a Member or employee of Congress” or
(2) “obtained from a Member or employee of Congress, and such per204
In addition, the
son knows that the information was so obtained.”
STOCK Act would amend congressional rules to prohibit members and
staff from sharing material nonpublic information with individuals be205
lieved to be using the information for trading purposes.
Second, the bill seeks timely disclosure of the securities transac206
tions of members of Congress, officers, and employees. Specifically,
it would amend the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 to require
members of Congress to disclose, within ninety days, any “purchase,
sale, or exchange of any stocks, bonds, commodities futures, or other
207
forms of securities” involving at least $1000.
Third, the legislation amends the LDA to bring politicalintelligence activity in line with general lobbying. Specifically, it
would require public reporting of “political intelligence activities” by
Representatives Baird and Slaughter’s legislation to prohibit insider trading, and reporting that the new bill was “strengthened to apply to all employees of the executive
branch, in addition to Congressional staffers and Members of Congress”).
202
Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 682, 111th Cong. (2009);
see also Press Release, Baird, supra note 2 (announcing the reintroduction of the
STOCK Act).
203
H.R. 5015; accord H.R. 682; H.R. 2341. The original 2006 bill only applied to the
legislative branch, but the 2007 and 2009 legislation extended to all federal employees
who derive material nonpublic information from their employment and to information
obtained from those employees. H.R. 682 sec. 2, § 10; H.R. 2341 sec. 2, § 10.
204
H.R. 682 sec. 2(a), § 10(c); H.R. 2341 sec. 2(a), § 10(c); H.R. 5015 sec. 2(a),
§ 10(c). Parallel prohibitions apply to other federal employees. H.R. 682 sec. 2(a),
§ 10(d); H.R. 2341 sec. 2(a), § 10(d).
205
H.R. 682 § 3; H.R. 2341 § 3. Originally, this was to be accomplished through
an SEC rule prohibiting members or staff from disclosing legislative information if the
member or staff “has reason to believe” that the information will be used for trading
purposes. H.R. 5015 sec. 2(a), § 10(c)(2). Certainly, the ethics approach in the current legislation is less potent than a corresponding amendment to the Exchange Act
and likely represents an accommodation.
206
H.R. 682 § 4; H.R. 2341 § 4; H.R. 5015 § 3.
207
H.R. 682 sec. 4(a), § 103(l ); H.R. 2341 sec. 4(a), § 103(l ); H.R. 5015 sec. 3(a),
§ 103(l ). Originally, the legislation introduced in the 109th Congress had a thirty-day
filing requirement. H.R. 5015 sec. 3(a), § 103(l ).
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208

“political intelligence consultant[s].”
Political-intelligence activities are “political intelligence contacts” and efforts in support of
209
A political-intelligence contact is defined as any
such contacts.
communication to or from the legislative or executive branch that
results in information “intended for use in analyzing securities or
commodities markets, or in informing investment decisions, and
which is made on behalf of a client” regarding “the formulation,
210
modification, or adoption of Federal legislation.”
The legislation received fourteen cosponsors in the 109th Congress, including Representative Slaughter and excluding the bill’s
211
primary sponsor, Representative Baird.
It was referred to several
212
committees but failed to receive any action.
The legislation introduced in the 110th Congress received ten cosponsors, including Representative Slaughter and excluding the primary sponsor, Representa213
tive Baird. Again, the legislation was referred to committee but did
214
not move. In the 111th Congress, there are currently seven cospon215
sors, excluding the primary sponsor, Representative Baird. In 2009,
the legislation received its first hearing, conducted by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Financial Services, which took testimony from Representatives Slaughter
216
and Baird, the SEC Inspector General, and three academics.

208

H.R. 682 sec. 5(a)(1), § 3(2); H.R. 2341 sec. 5(a)(1), § 3(2); H.R. 5015
sec. 4(a)(1), § 3(2).
209
H.R. 682 sec. 5(a)(2), § 3(17); H.R. 2341 sec. 5(a)(2), § 3(17). The 2006 legislation only covered contacts to the legislative branch. H.R. 5015 sec. 4(a)(2), § 3(18).
210
H.R. 682 sec. 5(a)(2), § 3(18); H.R. 2341 sec. 5(a)(2), § 3(18); cf. H.R. 5015
sec. 4(a)(2), § 3(18) (applying the same rule but only to the legislative branch).
211
See 152 CONG. REC. H1195 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2006); 152 CONG. REC. H1563
(daily ed. Apr. 5, 2006); 152 CONG. REC. H1853 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 2006); 152 CONG.
REC. H1917 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2006); 152 CONG. REC. H2586 (daily ed. May 11, 2006).
212
House Bill 5015 was referred to the House Committees on Financial Services,
Administration, Agriculture, and the Judiciary. H.R. 5015.
213
See 153 CONG. REC. H5290 (daily ed. May 16, 2007); 153 CONG. REC. H6236
(daily ed. June 11, 2007); 153 CONG. REC. H7340 (daily ed. June 27, 2007); 153 CONG.
REC. H8121 (daily ed. July 18, 2007); 153 CONG. REC. H11,028 (daily ed. Sept. 27,
2007); 154 CONG. REC. H5408 (daily ed. June 12, 2008); 154 CONG. REC. H10,642 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2008).
214
House Bill 2341 was referred to the same committees as the 2006 bill as well as
to the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. H.R. 2341.
215
See 155 CONG. REC. H525 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2009); 155 CONG. REC. H3706 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2009); 155 CONG. REC. H8009 (daily ed. July 10, 2009); 155 CONG. REC.
H8302 (daily ed. July 16, 2009); 155 CONG. REC. H8356 (daily ed. July 17, 2009); 155
CONG. REC. H13,386 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2009).
216
See Hearing on Preventing Unfair Trading by Government Officials, supra note 48.
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2. Political Intelligence Disclosure Act
Representatives Baird and Slaughter introduced the Political In217
telligence Disclosure Act in the 110th Congress, but they have not
yet reintroduced it in the 111th Congress. The legislation sought to
amend the LDA to require public reporting of political-intelligence
218
activities in precisely the same way as the STOCK Act.
Representatives Slaughter and Baird noted that the Bill “was inspired by legislation [they] introduced in the 109th and 110th Congresses that prohibits Members of Congress and federal employees from profiting from
219
nonpublic information they obtained from their official positions.”
In the 110th Congress, the Political Intelligence Disclosure Act received only one cosponsor in addition to Representatives Baird and
220
Slaughter. It was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary
221
and did not receive any action.
The fact that Representatives Baird and Slaughter chose to introduce the political-intelligence disclosure portion of the STOCK Act as
a stand-alone bill suggests political maneuvering. It will certainly be
easier to get Congress to accept the Political Intelligence Disclosure
Act by itself than the STOCK Act by itself, which would regulate the
222
members themselves and expose them to insider trading liability.
While Representatives Baird and Slaughter continue to push for the
much broader insider trading regulation prescribed by the STOCK
Act, the Political Intelligence Disclosure Act remains much more palatable to members of Congress.

217

Political Intelligence Disclosure Act, H.R. 5617, 110th Cong. (2008); see also Press
Release, Congressman Brian Baird, Reps. Slaughter and Baird Introduce Bill to Regulate
Political Intelligence Gathering (Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://www.house.gov/
list/press/wa03_baird/politicalintelbill.html (announcing the introduction of the Political Intelligence Disclosure Act, and characterizing the legislation as “a bill that requires
political intelligence firms to disclose their clients, profits, and activities, in the same way
that lobbyists are required to do under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995”).
218
See H.R. 5617 (stating its purpose as being “to amend the Lobbying Disclosure
Act of 1995 to require the disclosure of political intelligence activities”).
219
Press Release, Baird, supra note 217.
220
See 154 CONG. REC. H1701 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 2008); 154 CONG. REC. H3109
(daily ed. May 6, 2008).
221
See H.R. 5617.
222
See, e.g., Macey, supra note 46, at 309 (“The proposed legislation was killed in
congressional committee. Clearly, the SEC did not want to offend the politicians that
both oversee the agency and determine its funding.”).
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B. Insider Trading Law in the United Kingdom
Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom regulates insider
trading through a comprehensive statutory regime. Insider trading
was not a crime in the United Kingdom until Parliament implemented
223
the Companies Act 1980 (Companies Act). The Companies Act was
consolidated five years later in the Company Securities (Insider Deal224
ing) Act 1985 (Insider Dealing Act).
The Insider Dealing Act prohibited insiders from trading “(1) on the basis of unpublished pricesensitive information, (2) in the securities of the company of which he
225
The Insider
is an insider, (3) on a recognized stock exchange.”
Dealing Act defined insider as any individual who is, or had been within the previous six months, an employee, officer, or director of the
226
corporation, or was professionally related to the company.
The Insider Dealing Act explicitly included government employees in its definition of “insider,” prohibiting “insider trading by
crown servants and those who knowingly obtain inside information
227
from crown servants.” The Financial Services Act 1986 extended the
228
scope of the prohibition to all public servants.
The United Kingdom thus prohibited trading on political or governmental information by all royal and civil servants and by all outside individuals receiv229
ing information from these servants.
223

Companies Act, 1980, c. 22, §§ 68–73 (U.K.); see also Alexander F. Loke, From the
Fiduciary Theory to Information Abuse: The Changing Fabric of Insider Trading Law in the U.K.,
Australia and Singapore, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 123, 138 (2006) (“It was only in 1980 that insider trading became a crime under U.K. law, through Companies Act 1980 Part V.”).
224
Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985, c. 8, §§ 1–19 (U.K.).
225
Ronald E. Bornstein & N. Elaine Dugger, International Regulation of Insider Trading, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 375, 389 (footnotes omitted); see also Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act § 1.
226
Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act §§ 1, 9.
227
Bornstein & Dugger, supra note 225, at 390; see also Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act § 2 (prohibiting trading on information “held by a Crown servant or
former Crown servant” or obtained from a current or former Crown servant that the
servant should reasonably expect not to disclose or that involves “unpublished price
sensitive information in relation to securities of a particular company”).
228
See Financial Services Act, 1986, c. 60, § 173 (U.K.) (substituting the word “public” for the word “Crown” wherever it occurs).
229
See generally FLETCHER, supra note 131, at 226 (“In the United Kingdom, government employees are deemed insiders for purposes of the U.K.’s insider trading prohibitions. The Insider Dealing Act specifically prohibits insider trading by Crown servants
and those who knowingly obtain insider information from Crown Servants. Other countries that have statutory definitions of ‘insider’ similarly include government employees.”); Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 242 n.266 (1991) (summarizing the U.K. prohibition); Mark A.
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In 1989, the Council of the European Communities (the predecessor to the European Union) promulgated the European Economic
230
Community Directive Coordinating Insider Trading (1989 Directive).
The 1989 Directive set a minimum floor for European Community
231
member states’ insider trading laws.
Specifically, member states, including the United Kingdom, are required to prohibit trading based on
inside information that is obtained (1) because of “membership [in]
the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the issuer,”
(2) as a stockholder in the corporation, or (3) because of access to information “by virtue of the exercise of his employment, profession or
232
In 2003, the 1989 Directive was replaced with a more comduties.”
prehensive directive (2003 Directive), which covers options trading as
233
well as market manipulation. The 2003 Directive retains the same definitions of insider trading as the 1989 Directive and should be viewed
234
as complementary to the earlier Directive.
The E.U. definition of “insider” does not draw the same fiduciary
235
line that U.S. law does, although there could be significant overlap.

Spitz, Note, Recent Developments in Insider Trading Laws and Problems of Enforcement in Great
Britain, 12 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 265, 275-83 (1989) (providing an overview of the
United Kingdom’s statutory prohibitions against insider trading).
230
Council Directive 89/592/EEC, Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing,
1989 O.J. (L 334) 30.
231
Id. art. V; see also Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trading, Selective Disclosure, and
Prompt Disclosure: A Comparative Analysis, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 635, 662 n.142
(2001) (“The Directive, for example, sets forth minimum standards for defining the
concepts of ‘inside information’ and ‘insider’ with respect to which Member States of
the European Union must comply.”).
232
Council Directive 89/592/EEC, art. II; see also Council Directive 2003/6/EC, art.
2(1), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16, 21 (listing the same three types of forbidden inside information and also including information obtained “by virtue of . . . criminal activities”).
233
See Council Directive 2003/6/EC, art. 1; see also Eric Engle, Insider Trading in
U.S. and E.U. Law: A Comparison 26 (Sept. 22, 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1271868 (surveying the efforts of the European
Community to create a Community standard on prohibitions against insider trading).
234
See Engle, supra note 233, at 27 (“The basic premises of the 1989 Directive are retained within the 2003 Directive and the 1989 Directive may be persuasive evidence of
the meaning of the 2003 Directive.”); id. at 30 (“In all events, the judicial interpretations
of the meaning of the earlier Directive very likely apply to the successor Directive.”).
235
See Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 9, 23 (1999) (“[U]nlike the U.S. insider trading laws, determination of
illegal trading is based not on breach of a fiduciary duty, but rather, on possession of
non-public information.”); Carolyn Silane, Electronic Data Theft: A Legal Loophole for Illegally-Obtained Information—A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and E.U. Insider Trading Law, 5
SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 333, 352 (2009) (“Unlike the United States, the E.U. has
soundly rejected any requirement of a fiduciary duty in favor of a straightforward rule
against an imbalance of information in securities transactions.”).
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As a result, “[s]ome of the professionals [covered by the 1989 Directive] may have a contractual relationship with the issuer which is not
236
Others who do not have a contractual or
of a fiduciary character.”
fiduciary relationship with the security issuer are still covered, including “members of the central bank, the press, the parliament, the ministry of economics and of other institutions, committees and bodies who
may possess inside information because of their profession or their
237
duties.”
The Directive’s broad definition suggests that the Council
was promulgating a definition of insider trading that would prohibit
trading based on political intelligence in the entire European Union.
In compliance with the 1989 Directive, the United Kingdom
enacted Part V of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (Criminal Justice
238
Act). Part V of the Act “completely replaced the existing law on in239
sider trading” in the United Kingdom. The Criminal Justice Act defines “insider” along the same lines as the Directives, including the
expansive definition of inside information as information obtained
240
“by virtue of [one’s] employment, office or profession.” The Criminal Justice Act does not specifically classify “public servants” as insiders. Nonetheless, this prong is considered broad enough to encompass “public servants,” consistent with the insider trading regime that
241
The United Kingdom, despite
the Criminal Justice Act replaced.
amendments to its insider trading statutes over the past thirty years,
remains committed to the categorical prohibition of trading based on
inside political intelligence.
U.K. and E.U. law suggest an approach that may serve as an example for the United States. Representatives Baird and Slaughter attempt to import a component of the U.K./E.U. prohibition into
American doctrine, but doing so is flawed because U.K./E.U. insider
trading doctrine departs markedly from that of the United States.

236

Klaus J. Hopt, The European Insider Dealing Directive, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
51, 64 (1990).
237
Id. (emphasis added).
238
Criminal Justice Act, 1993, c. 36, §§ 52–64 (U.K.).
239
Richard G. Small, Towards a Theory of Contextual Transplants, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV.
1431, 1453 (2005); see also Keith Wotherspoon, Insider Dealing—The New Law: Part V of the
Criminal Justice Act 1993, 57 MOD. L. REV. 419, 420 (1994) (“[P]rovisions in Part V of the
1993 Act wholly supersede the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 . . . .”).
240
Criminal Justice Act 1993 § 57(2).
241
See Wotherspoon, supra note 239, at 426 (“The provision in section 57(2)(a)(ii) is
also wide enough to cover public servants whose official duties give them access to pricesensitive information.” (footnote omitted)). This would include, for example, “officials
in the Bank of England or the Monopolies and Mergers Commission.” Id. at 426 n.57.
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First, unlike the United Kingdom and the European Union, the United States does not provide a statutory definition of insider trading. As
demonstrated in Part II, insider trading has come to be defined by
judicial interpretation. Though this does not preclude legislative definition, it suggests that the Baird-Slaughter legislation would only add
to an already ad hoc insider trading regime.
Second, U.K. law does not provide a good point of reference because the United Kingdom (and the European Union) wholly em242
braces an access-to-information theory of insider trading regulation.
Part IV shows how an access-to-information theory can help to make
sense of the policy motivations underlying insider trading law, but
243
these have been rejected by U.S. courts. Rather, Part II demonstrated that the U.S. approach is inextricably linked with fiduciary duties.
The U.K. prohibition and the E.U. Directives sever any fiduciary re244
The Baird-Slaughter legislation attempts to regulate
quirement.
outside actors who have access to political information, which may
make sense under a regime predicated upon an access-to-information
theory, but not under a regime rooted in fiduciary duty concepts, as is
the case in the United States.
Third, consideration of U.S. insider trading doctrine’s objectives
militates against adopting an approach similar to those of the United
Kingdom and the European Union. Part IV considers whether insider trading law should include trading upon political intelligence
and concludes that many policy objectives animating U.S. insider
trading law generally are inapplicable to the political-intelligence
context and that, in at least one context, insider trading regulation
would not sufficiently address these political corruption issues. Accordingly, an ethics approach that makes use of such tools as a blind
trust—whereby members of Congress are completely unaware of
current and prospective investments—is the best mechanism for
preventing trading on political intelligence.

242

See Loke, supra note 223, at 126-37 (arguing that the United States still takes a
fiduciary approach while other countries, such as the United Kingdom, have moved
toward a theory that defines insider trading by access to information); Silane, supra
note 235, at 352 (“Unlike the United States, the E.U. has soundly rejected any requirement of fiduciary duty in favor of a straightforward rule against an imbalance of
information in securities transactions.”).
243
See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
244
See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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IV. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES ADOPT A DEFINITION
OF INSIDER TRADING THAT INCLUDES TRADING ON
POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE?
One of the great debates about insider trading has been whether to
regulate it at all. Numerous scholars have rejected insider trading pro245
hibitions as contrary to the fundamental aim of efficient markets.
That debate is outside the scope of this Comment. Accordingly, this
Part puts aside the deregulation discussion and assumes the current
regulatory regime. As became clear in Part II, current insider trading
doctrine does not adequately accommodate regulating trading on political intelligence. A few theories of insider trading may arguably encompass certain political-intelligence trading activities. As a response,
legislation introduced in Congress is seeking to clarify the situation and
to follow the United Kingdom in bringing political-intelligence trading
within securities law. This Part asks whether this is a result to be desired. Specifically, what normative justifications animate the U.S. prohibition on insider trading? Do these underlying public policy consid246
erations support a ban on political-intelligence trading?
To begin, the Exchange Act was enacted to protect the integrity of
247
the financial markets. Congress has adhered to this sweeping justification, noting that trading on material nonpublic information threat-

245

See generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966)
(arguing that insider trading is beneficial because it causes market prices of securities
to more accurately reflect the price of stocks had the inside information been public,
thus helping all investors and the company).
246
Another approach has been to consider political-intelligence trading against the
arguments for deregulating insider trading. See Barbabella, Cohen, Kardon & Molk, supra note 24, at 223-34. This approach, which asks whether the general arguments in favor of deregulating insider trading also support not regulating political-intelligence trading, is flawed for two reasons. First, the arguments for deregulation have been rejected.
They have failed to prevail in the traditional corporate context, so why are they relevant
to political intelligence? Second, the deregulation approach assumes the wrong baseline
for evaluating whether to include trading on political intelligence in the insider trading
framework. The starting point for considering political-intelligence trading is the status
quo of no regulation. The question, then, is whether we should regulate. In asking this
question, we look to the normative reasons for regulating insider trading generally and
ask whether they are salient in the context of political intelligence. If the arguments for
regulating corporate insider trading are persuasive in the context of political intelligence, they will militate in favor of insider trading regulation.
247
See H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 2-5, 13 (1934) (identifying the purpose of the bill as
regulating the stock exchange in order to curb harmful speculation); S. REP. NO. 73-792,
at 3, 9 (1934) (same); 1944 SEC ANN. REP. 50 (noting the “inequitable character” of insider trading and various provisions in the 1934 Act designed to curtail this abuse).
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248

ens “the fair and honest operation of our securities markets.”
The
ABA Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading concluded that
commonsense observations suggest that two of the traditional bases for
prohibitions against insider trading are still sound: the “fair play” and
“integrity of the markets” arguments. The first relies on the basic policy
that cheating is wrong and on the traditional sympathy for the victim of
the cheat. The second rests on the oft-repeated argument that people
will not entrust their resources to a marketplace they don’t believe is fair,
any more than a card player will put his chips on the table in a poker
249
game that may be fixed.

Securities laws achieve “fair play” and “integrity” through intensive
disclosure requirements that compel covered entities, particularly
corporations, to make certain corporate information public.
Such broad objectives of fairness and market integrity, however,
provide very little guidance on their faces. Any disparity of information could certainly be deemed “unfair” and thus a threat to public
confidence in the market. Digging deeper, we find public policy arguments divided into economic and noneconomic terms, namely,
250
fairness.
This Part briefly analyzes each justification and applies
each to political intelligence.
A. Fairness
The essence of the fairness argument is that something is inherently wrong when one trader possesses information unknown by
251
another trader—the informational advantage is unfair. Insider trading law, however, has never presupposed a parity-of-information stan252
dard. In fact, true equality of information among all investors would
undermine one investor’s ability to profit in the marketplace and ar253
Others have proposed, in
guably destroy profit motive altogether.
248

H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 8 (1988); see also ELIZABETH SZOCKYJ, THE LAW AND
INSIDER TRADING 2 (1993) (arguing that people will not trust their resources to a system that they do not think is fair).
249
Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., Am. Bar Ass’n, Report of the Task Force on
Regulation of Insider Trading (pt. 1), 41 BUS. LAW. 223, 227 (1985).
250
This categorization follows Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 70-82.
251
See Fisch, supra note 229, at 220-21 (“Whether other traders are harmed directly, such as by inducement to trade at an incorrect price, or indirectly, through the
presence in the market of other traders who possess an overwhelming informational
advantage, inequality of information is at the heart of the fairness rationale.”).
252
See, e.g., Netter, Poulsen & Hersch, supra note 33, at 2 (arguing that possessing
asymmetric information does not and should not violate insider trading law).
253
See MACEY, supra note 100, at 21.
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lieu of an equal-information standard, an equal-access-to-information
approach. In this regard, insider trading is perceived as unfair because the insider possesses a “lawful monopoly on access to the infor254
The Sumation involved . . . which cannot be competed away.”
preme Court has expressly rejected, as legal theories, parity of infor255
But the access-toinformation and equal access to information.
information justification is helpful in constructing a public policy basis
for insider trading prohibitions.
If insider trading is animated by unfair access to information,
where should we draw the line between fair and unfair informational
advantages? One can imagine the equal-access-to-information theory
ranking potential investors on a continuum with regard to the infor256
mation they possess.
At one end of the continuum are the corporate insiders who hold secret, firm-specific information, while at the
other extreme are the “proverbial grandparents who have little access
257
An insider trading law
to even publicly available information.”
rooted in the access theory picks a point on the continuum at which
investor access is considered too great and deems the investors insid258
The dividing line separates leers for purposes of the prohibition.
gal informational advantages from illegal informational advantages.
Where do government insiders and outside actors reside on the
continuum of access to political intelligence? Government insiders
represent the equivalent of corporate insiders. Politicians and their
staff possess intimate knowledge of legislative initiatives and have direct access to decisionmakers, or they are themselves the ultimate decider. As we have seen, this assertion is supported through empirical
research demonstrating the substantial trading advantages of U.S.
259
Senators. In fact, as explained earlier, the evidence suggests that the
informational advantage of Senators is greater than that of corporate
254

Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 346 (1979).
255
The parity-of-information theory was rejected in Dirks v. SEC. See 463 U.S. 646,
657 (1983) (“Judge Wright correctly read our opinion in Chiarella as repudiating any
notion that all traders must enjoy equal information before trading.”). The equalaccess-to-information theory was rejected in Chiarella v. United States. See 445 U.S. 222,
235 n.20 (1980) (rejecting the proposition that persons having access to information
that is not legally available to others should be prohibited from exploiting such information); see also Bainbridge, supra note 24, at 4-5 (discussing the Court’s rejection of
both theories).
256
This concept is derived from Netter, Poulsen & Hersch, supra note 33, at 6.
257
Id.
258
Id. at 6-7.
259
See supra subsection I.A.1.
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260

insiders trading in their own firms. Government insiders, then, possess a monopoly over political information that places them at a dis261
tinct informational advantage over the marketplace.
Outside actors—lobbyists and hedge funds—reside much further
down the continuum. K Street lobbyists are to Washington what analysts and market professionals are to Wall Street. Market professionals
are analysts and researchers who expend considerable resources ferreting out little-known, market-moving information. Whereas these
market professionals have much more market information than the
262
average small investor, lobbyists possess much more political information than the average constituent. Market professionals expend
significant resources acquiring their informational advantages and
gain these advantages “through discussions with corporate insiders,
following the progress of important litigation, or monitoring news re263
They analyze the inforports and the Dow Jones tape constantly.”
mation and make informed, yet speculative, predictions. Similarly,
lobbyists keep tabs on the political pulse through discussions with
government insiders, monitoring legislative proposals, and attending
committee hearings.
The information that market professionals acquire through diligent research is legitimate and can be used in making investment de264
cisions.
The Supreme Court has suggested that an informational
advantage is improper, however, if it “cannot be overcome with re265
search or skill.” Since market professionals are presumed to be acting on information that they gathered through “research or skill,” and
not through exclusive insider access to information, they reside
beyond insiders on the access to information continuum. Through
diligent research or investment of resources, the theory goes, any in266
vestor could access such information.
260

See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
This is the basis for Professor Langevoort’s conclusion that government insiders are liable under Rule 10b-5. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
262
Fisch, supra note 229, at 222.
263
Id. at 222-23; see also MACEY, supra note 100, at 13 (“Market professionals will be
able to obtain, assimilate, and process information about firms far more quickly than
small investors.”).
264
See Netter, Poulsen & Hersch, supra note 33, at 5 (“Individuals who acquire material nonpublic information in other legal manners, such as legitimate research or
accidental tips, may trade on it freely without disclosure.”).
265
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658-59 (1997).
266
See MACEY, supra note 100, at 22 (“[I]t could be argued . . . that everyone has
‘equal access’ because anyone could have hired the analyst who discovers valuable information in the course of his employment. Indeed, anyone could become an ana261
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Like analysts and market professionals, lobbyists have the skills
and resources to read and interpret the political balance sheets of
Washington. Hedge funds have the resources to hire lobbyists. Lobbying firms offer the Washington equivalent of the market pulse.
Average investors could fine-tune their political savvy and access
much of the same information that lobbyists provide, in the same way
that they could research and access superior market information provided by analysts. One may be surprised to find that political information is more readily available than corporate information. Investors
cannot simply call up a company and demand access to decisionmakers; not even shareholders of a company can make such requests. The
political process is (at least theoretically) more open and inclusive, as
elected officials are responsive to their constituents. Admittedly, powerful, networked lobbyists may get their phone calls to Capitol Hill
returned more quickly than a single constituent, but in the corporate
arena, large institutional investors or networked market professionals
will likewise carry more weight than a single investor.
If one accepts access to information as a theoretical underpinning
of insider trading, one would construct a continuum of access to information that placed government insiders alongside corporate insiders and placed lobbyists (and their hedge fund clients) alongside
market professionals. The theory would justify defining these government insiders as insiders for purposes of the federal securities laws.
At the same time, the access-to-information theory would not go so far
as to extend the definition to encompass outside actors trading on political intelligence.
B. Economic Justifications for Prohibiting Insider Trading
1. Injury to Investors
The investor-injury argument maintains that insider trading either
(1) causes outside investors to trade at an inaccurate price or (2) in267
duces investors to make bad purchases or sales.
The first theory claims that investors who trade alongside insiders
with access to information are wronged because they bought or sold at

lyst.”); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 254 (1991).
267
See Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 71 (stating these arguments but finding neither of them convincing).
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a bad price—a price that did not reflect the inside information.
This argument is considered flawed because, on impersonal ex269
The harm
changes, one never knows with whom she is trading.
would occur regardless of whether the information was possessed by
270
an insider or another outsider. “It is purely fortuitous that an insid271
er was on the other side of the transaction.”
The second theory provides that price discrepancies resulting
272
from insider trading induce investors to make poor decisions. Such
injury to investors must be prohibited, it is argued, because investor
273
injury will undermine confidence in the markets, and market
integrity is a fundamental aim of insider trading prohibitions. This
argument is discredited because, even “assuming that some investors
are misled by those effects[,] . . . many transactions would have taken
place regardless of the price changes resulting from insider trad274
ing.”
Putting aside the merits of the investor-injury justification, it appears that government insider trading would harm investors in the
same way as corporate insider trading. It is hard to distinguish the two
types of insider trading on that level.
2. Injury to Issuers
The issuer-injury justification is not relevant to trading on political
intelligence. The justification maintains that insider trading may injure a firm by (1) creating incentives for those lower in the corporate
hierarchy to delay reporting information to supervisors; (2) interfering with corporate plans, such as an insider buying stock in a target
company during merger negotiations and thereby raising the acquisi275
tion cost; or (3) injuring the reputation of a firm. The issuer-injury
argument supports a definition of insider trading that is concerned
with harm resulting from true corporate insiders. If anything, this justification militates against extending insider trading law to include
those who trade on political intelligence, as government insiders cannot possibly injure a company under any of the three threads.
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275

Id.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 73.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 75-78.
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3. Property Rights
Probably the most embraced justification for insider trading pro276
hibitions is the property rights theory.
The theory maintains that
corporate information is property of the corporation, and that the
277
“conversion of the property for the insider’s personal use is a theft.”
An insider or misappropriator who uses corporate property is a
278
“thief,” while a tippee is the recipient of “stolen property.”
The
property rights approach has been discredited, however, because if inside information is truly corporate property, then the government
should not involve itself in internal corporate affairs by dictating how
279
those rights are allocated.
A prohibition on insider trading, consequently, assigns a property
280
interest in inside information to the corporation.
This theory is
congruent to insider trading doctrine developed by the Supreme
276

See generally MACEY, supra note 100, at 67 (“[T]he only conceivable justification
for banning insider trading is that such trading involves the theft of valuable corporate
property from its rightful owner.”); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 861 (1983) (arguing that there exist “several incentive and information effects which suggest that there may be gains from allocating property rights in valuable information to managers as opposed to investors”);
Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 331 (discussing the “business property rationale,” which applies only when secrecy is necessary to preserve the value of the information to the firm); Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable
Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 718-20 (1980) (discussing the value of internal information and how it is wasteful for an external institution to have to replicate this information); Gary Lawson, The Ethics of Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 727,
759-71 (1988) (discussing the merits of a property rights approach to insider trading
generally and advancing a Lockean theory of insider trading); Richard J. Morgan, Insider Trading and the Infringement of Property Rights, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 79, 80 (1987) (articulating a “policy basis for the regulation of insider trading . . . that is based on the notion of inside information as property that can be owned and used by or for the benefit
of the owner or creator of that property”); Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 78-82 (“In
short, the federal insider trading prohibition is justifiable solely as a means of protecting property rights in information.”).
277
Fisch, supra note 229, at 224.
278
Id.
279
See id. at 225-26 (“[V]iewing inside information as property justifies treating the
misappropriation of that property as theft but correspondingly requires the government to defer to firm decisions contractually allocating the entitlement to that property.”); see also MACEY, supra note 100, at 69 (“[T]he way to approach the problem of insider trading is to identify property rights in information. . . . Thus, firms ought to be
able to allocate the right to engage in insider trading to whomever they wish . . . .”).
This debate is outside the scope of this Comment.
280
See Bainbridge, supra note 131, at 78 (“In effect, the federal insider trading
prohibition vests a property right . . . in the party to whom the insider trader owes a
fiduciary duty to refrain from self dealing in confidential information.”)
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Court and, as a result, is intertwined with fiduciary duty concepts. As
elaborated above, the Court’s doctrine distinguishes between those
who are fiduciaries or confidants of the source of the information,
281
and those who are not. Those who are insiders cannot trade on the
information—corporate property—to which they are privy. The
property rights theory maintains that this is because such trading is es282
sentially corporate thievery.
Under the property rights justification for insider trading regulation, we must ask whether political intelligence is property, and, if so,
whose property. The argument necessarily depends on a showing that
political information is property of the government and, by implication, the American public. Theft occurs when government insiders
steal information from the public and use it for personal gain.
Federal corruption and bribery laws are instructive. The federal
bribery statute makes it a punishable offense for anyone to confer anything of value upon any public official with intent “to influence any
283
official act.”
One tenable view considers government corruption to
be “the sale by government officials of government property for personal
284
gain.” The theory presupposes that official action is property belonging to the government and that corruption is the sale thereof. It would
seem reasonable to say the same thing of official government information. By extension, then, the misappropriation of official information is
theft of government property in the same way as corruption.
The property rights justification for insider trading regulation
would support an extensive ban on all trades based on material nonpublic political information. First, government insiders would be
stealing government property when they profit from trading on political information. It would be impossible to distinguish the government insider’s theft from the corporate insider’s. Second, outside actors who trade on political intelligence would also be trading illegally
because any information they received from Capitol Hill would be
government property. The hedge fund is like the tippee in the corporate context whose tip consists of “stolen property.” Trading on stolen
281

See supra Section II.A.
It is hard to see how this differs much from self-dealing or corporate opportunity doctrines that derive from duty of loyalty concepts in state corporate fiduciary duty
law. This may lead one to ask whether federal securities law serves any purpose beyond
those already served by state law. If federal securities law is justified on a property
rights theory, then the answer appears to be “no.”
283
18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A) (2006).
284
ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. VISHNY, THE GRABBING HAND: GOVERNMENT
PATHOLOGIES AND THEIR CURES 91 (1998) (emphasis added).
282
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property would be misappropriation, regardless of whether there were
a breach of confidentiality.
4. Corporate Governance and Moral Hazard
Insider trading is also deemed harmful because it creates a moral
hazard by allowing corporate insiders to profit on bad news. Corporate insiders are able to benefit from poor decisions by selling the
firm’s stock short or by disseminating “false information about the
firm so that they can profit by buying and selling mispriced securi285
ties.” This argument claims that “allowing insiders to profit on bad
information makes managers indifferent between working to make
286
the firm prosperous and working to make it bankrupt.” The moral
hazard creates a governance issue because officers may make operational decisions that are based on trading potential and not on the
merits of the decision.
A similar problem could arise with respect to government insiders
who profit on legislative decisions. Like the corporate insider who
may bankrupt the firm for personal gain, government insiders may
succumb to a moral hazard by making decisions based on potential
trading gains and not on what is best for constituents. As Part II explained, government insiders are not required to divest themselves of
assets over which they exercise legislative jurisdiction. What is crucial
to realize is that insider trading regulation of government insiders will
not solve the moral hazard or governance concerns. Prohibiting trading on political intelligence will preclude members of Congress from
trading after acquiring material nonpublic political information, but it
will not keep them from voting based on preexisting portfolios. An
insider trading approach to political intelligence will fail to account
287
for the moral hazard and corporate governance policy concerns.
C. Fundamental Goal: Financial Market Integrity
All of the foregoing indicates that insider trading poses a threat to
the integrity of our financial markets. This, of course, is the fundamental aim of our securities laws. Insider trading is harmful because
it reduces confidence in the markets. Consequently, the federal se285

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 266, at 260.
Carlton & Fischel, supra note 276, at 873; see also MACEY, supra note 100, at 34
(finding that the moral hazard problem presupposes managers who are better compensated if the firm is doing well).
287
I am grateful to Professor Fisch for bringing this argument to my attention.
286
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curities laws restore this confidence by requiring corporations to make
288
public disclosures.
And where corporate information is not disclosed—where it is “inside”—insiders must refrain from trading on
the basis of that information.
The underlying harm associated with insider trading justifications—
undermining market integrity—does not hold up under a politicalintelligence analysis. When government officials trade on political information, the public is indeed outraged. Yet it is not market integrity
that is undermined but rather governmental integrity. Public anger is
directed not at the financial system but at a political system that is seen
as unethical: it is not insider trading but political corruption.
Observe the following logical parallels between trading by government insiders and corporate insiders. Trading by government insiders is bad because public officials are abusing the privileges of
elected office. They are personally profiting at the expense of the
public. The damage decreases public trust and confidence in the political system. Without trust in government, government cannot func289
tion. Political governance laws—the Hatch Act, the federal bribery
290
291
statute, the Federal Election Campaign Act, the Ethics in Govern292
293
ment Act, House and Senate ethics rules, and so forth—serve to
remedy distrust in the political system.
Trading by corporate insiders is also bad because corporate insiders
are abusing their corporate privileges. They are profiting at the expense of other corporate shareholders and other market participants.
This damage decreases shareholder and investor trust in corporations
and confidence in the financial system. Without trust in financial markets, corporations cannot function. The federal securities laws were designed and are enforced to remedy distrust of financial markets. Why
288

See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006) (“[N]ational
public interest . . . makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such
transactions and of practices and matters related thereto, including transactions by officers, directors, and principal security holders, to require appropriate reports . . . .”).
289
5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–7326 (2006) (limiting the ability of federal employees to engage in partisan activities).
290
See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006) (criminalizing bribery of public officials).
291
See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3
(1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) (reforming the law relating to campaign communications and funding).
292
See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5 & 28 U.S.C.) (imposing several restrictions on
public servants, including financial disclosure requirements, postemployment activity restrictions, and limits on the receipt of certain outside income, including gifts).
293
See HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 69; SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 71.
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should the federal securities laws be charged with doing the work of
political ethics?
Admittedly, government insiders are market players who can af294
fect pricing through investment practices.
With government insiders, the primary danger is not a loss of public confidence in the financial system but rather a loss of confidence in the political system. Any
market effect is incidental and disappears once a political ethics rule
addresses the practice. An ethics approach would achieve the theoretical goals underlying the securities laws by addressing both fairness
and property concerns and would do so much more effectively. The
final Part of this Comment addresses these alternative proposals.
V. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS
This Comment has explored political-intelligence trading through
the lens of current insider trading doctrine and its underlying justifications. It has attempted to map insider trading law onto government
insiders and outside actors who profit from trading on political information. To do so would have required stretching the doctrine to a
point at which insider trading becomes divorced from its statutory bedrock—the Exchange Act—the primary purpose of which is to promote market integrity through disclosure of corporate information. It
has never been the province of the SEC to write and enforce political
ethics laws.
Even still, we are no less outraged by profiteering politicians today
than Thomas Jefferson and James Madison were over 200 years ago. Several theories of why we regulate insider trading—particularly unfairness
and property rights—provide a compelling reason to bring trading by
government insiders into the fold. As we now see, these concerns are
more effectively and appropriately remedied through political ethics
laws, not by mutilating insider trading doctrine beyond recognition.
A. Nature and Characteristics of Political Intelligence
The analysis so far has revealed several characteristics of political
intelligence that distinguish it from the material nonpublic information at issue in classic insider trading cases, thereby making coverage
under the federal securities laws inappropriate. This Section briefly

294

Arguably, government insider trading affects the markets to a much lesser extent than corporate insider trading because government insiders are a relatively small
and defined group.
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summarizes these differences as they pertain specifically to government insiders and outside actors.
1. Government Insiders
First, the primary harm of allowing government insiders to trade
on political information is the threat to governmental integrity. Politicians’ abuses of authority are addressed by ethics rules and political
295
governance laws. The federal bribery statute, for example, prohibits
the sale of political deeds and could suitably address conversion of
government information for personal profit. Accordingly, perceived
corruption associated with government insiders’ trading should be
addressed through ethics reform.
Second, to the extent that governmental insider trading impacts
financial markets, the impact is small. Politicians are a discrete, defined group, unlike expansive corporate circles. At most, any harm is
incidental and disappears once the primary harm is remedied
through ethics laws.
Third, when insiders trade on political intelligence, a fiduciary duty in the traditional insider trading sense is never breached. Part II
applied current doctrine to political intelligence and revealed a fundamental weakness. Namely, our insider trading doctrine is inextricably linked with concepts of corporate fiduciary duties, which are difficult to impose on government insiders, let alone outside actors.
2. Outside Actors
First, political intelligence is information that, unlike corporate information, has a public ownership component. Namely, democracy accords the public a right to meet with and receive information from
their elected officials. In the earlier discussion of property rights, it was
argued that the public owns governmental information and can de296
mand access to it. This is a presumption of the Freedom of Information Act, for example, which requires the government to release infor297
mation to any person requesting it unless an exemption applies. This
is not to say that all political information is “public” in the sense that it
is widely known. The important distinction here is that the nature of
political information is public, whereas the nature of corporate infor-

295
296
297

18 U.S.C. § 201.
See supra subsection IV.B.3.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. I 2009).
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mation is private. Public ownership of information and access to public
information make it difficult to argue that political information is
equivalent to inside corporate information, which is privately held.
Such a finding certainly undermines any claim that outside actors are
improperly trading on political information, as the outside actors could
298
be perceived as merely exercising their democratic rights.
Second, trading on political intelligence is highly speculative because it is seldom based on concrete or firm-specific information.
Political intelligence is far different than the quintessential corporate inside information. Lobbying firms rarely claim to provide
299
“hot” tips but rather offer general political analysis. Lobbyists may
gather a dozen tidbits of information from talking with congressional staff, monitoring legislation, reading the news, or attending congressional hearings. They interpret each separate piece of information and make their best prediction of future legislative activity. The
information is relayed to the hedge fund client, who then speculates
as to how the market will react in the event that the legislative prediction rings true. There are at least two layers of speculation. Political-intelligence trading is at least as speculative, if not more so, than
trading on information gathered by market analysts and researchers,
300
which is perfectly legal. Moreover, it is a far cry from firm-specific

298

It is much easier to argue that government insiders are converting public property because their elected positions give them unique access to information unattainable
by any other person. This does not disrupt the argument as it pertains to outside actors, since all persons have equal access to political intelligence. Equal access, not
equal resources, is what matters.
299
See Snyder, supra note 100 (“Lobbyists say they more often provide their Wall
Street clients with information about how Washington works, rather than hot tips that
could move stocks.”). “Hot” political tips are at best market information. Unlike “inside information,” which is derived from within the corporation, market information is
information that “originates from sources other than the issuer and involves events or
circumstances concerning or affecting the price or market for the issuer’s securities
and does not concern the issuer’s assets or earning power.” Bainbridge, supra note
131, at 16; see also SZOCKYJ, supra note 248, at 5 (describing the reach of insider trading
law beyond information from the issuer or about earnings to information that could
affect market prices). Both forms of information are covered by insider trading law.
Chiarella, for example, was said to be trading on market information that he obtained
from tender offer documents because the information was not obtained from the issuer in which he traded but did affect the issuer’s market price. Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 231-35 (1980). The information Chiarella received was firm specific and certain. Even the best political information will, in most cases, only be general market information that may or may not affect a host of companies within a given
affected industry.
300
See supra Section IV.A.
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corporate inside information at issue in landmark insider trading
cases and scandals.
Third, outside actors who gather political intelligence are no different than market analysts. This Part concludes by arguing that not
only are outside actors performing a legitimate function equivalent to
market professionals but also that their information gathering is beneficial for market efficiency and should not be discouraged.
B. Proposals
These characteristics of political information militate against
bringing it within the purview of the federal securities laws. Yet, in all
likelihood, some of this trading should be prohibited. To that end,
the following proposals are made.
1. Blind Trusts: An Ethics Approach to Regulating Trading by
Members of Congress and Selected Staff
301

Members of Congress and certain staff should be required to put
their assets in blind trusts upon assuming their positions. How would
the blind trust requirement work? A model already exists but at present
is only optional. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 imposes financial disclosure requirements on public officials in all three branches of
302
government. The Act requires public officials and certain employees
303
to disclose their financial assets annually. To avoid disclosure of exact
investments, however, covered individuals can elect to maintain assets
304
A “qualified blind trust” provides “an optional mein a blind trust.
chanism for circumventing full disclosure of financial interests while at
305
the same time avoiding conflicts with official duties.” It is “blind” because it regulates communications between the trustee and “interested
party,” so that a trustee “shall not consult or notify any interested par-

301

This Comment does not delve into the specifics of which staff members
should be required to maintain blind trusts but leaves that to legislative determination or further debate.
302
Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
2, 5 & 28 U.S.C.); see also Megan J. Ballard, The Shortsightedness of Blind Trusts, 56 U.
KAN. L. REV. 43, 43-44 (2007) (“The Federal Ethics in Government Act requires certain
national policymakers and employees to publicly disclose their financial interests on an
annual basis.”).
303
5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 102(a) (2006).
304
See Ballard, supra note 302, at 44, 51.
305
Id. at 49.
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306

ty.” In essence, only the trustee will know which securities are held in
the trust, thereby making the member of Congress “blind” to the composition of the trust. As a result, members will be unable to make legislative decisions that positively impact their portfolios. Moreover, they
will be unable to trade on political information since investment authority will be delegated entirely to the trustee.
Some members of Congress have voluntarily elected to maintain
307
assets in blind trusts.
Though the operation of blind trusts in the
308
legislative branch has received scrutiny —namely, for lax enforcement—the more stringent application in the executive branch pro309
vides a viable model to follow.
A blind-trust approach is superior to regulating political intelligence through securities laws for several reasons. First, the blind-trust
requirement adequately addresses the public policy concerns underlying insider trading law that were identified in Part IV by categorically
precluding government insiders from being market participants. Further, such an approach is “fair” because it precludes those with access
to inside information from trading on it. It also is a way to prevent
“theft” of public property by government insiders, because there is no
way for government insiders to reap financial gain. Lastly, it addresses
the moral hazard governance concerns that are left unmitigated under an insider trading approach.
Second, the blind-trust approach leaves current insider trading doctrine in place. As the analysis in Part II demonstrated, applying insider
trading doctrine to the government context is particularly troublesome.
306

5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 102(f)(3)(C)(i).
See Len Costa, A Wink and a Nod, LEGAL AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 18, 19 (reporting that, as of 2006, eighteen U.S. Senators and several U.S. Representatives maintained qualified blind trusts).
308
See Hearing on Preventing Unfair Trading by Government Officials, supra note 48, at
4-5 (proposed statement of Alan J. Ziobrowski) (arguing that blind trusts are a good
idea for members of Congress but that that the “rules [must] be tightened to clearly
define a blind trust making them absolutely blind”); Ballard, supra note 302, at 43 (criticizing Senator Frist’s blind trust for not being truly blind); Costa, supra note 307, at
19 (discussing the failure of Senator Frist’s blind trust and noting that “Congress has
never been very effective at applying its ethics rules to itself”).
309
As one commentator notes,
307

Many legal experts and good-government advocates still contend that blind
trusts can be an effective safeguard against conflicts of interest; they point to
the successful use of blind trusts in the executive branch and believe that, if
Congress were to adopt the same culture of strict enforcement, abuses like
those allegedly committed by Frist would be far less likely.
Costa, supra note 307, at 19.
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There is considerable disagreement over the scope of current doctrine.
This Comment has suggested throughout that there is no place in section 10(b) for politics. To hold government officials liable as inside
traders would be to mistake our government for a corporation. Even if
one disagrees with the argument, it is difficult to deny that the insider
trading approach is murky, that applying current doctrine is a real
stretch, and that using the federal securities laws to regulate government officials is highly suspect. The blind-trust requirement would
achieve the same objectives as insider trading regulation without defining section 10(b) away from its statutory foundation.
Third, the blind-trust approach is more effective at preventing
abuse than the insider trading approach. An insider trading prohibition may prevent members of Congress from making investment decisions based on political information, but it will not prevent them from
making political decisions based on their preexisting market positions. This means that under an insider trading regime, members of
Congress will still be able to vote in a way that maximizes their portfolio values. As propounded in Part I, current congressional ethics laws
do not require members to divest themselves or to refrain from voting
on matters in which they have a financial interest. Insider trading can
account only for the use of information in the market but cannot prevent abuse of position. The latter is an enormous concern because
governmental decisions affect entire markets, whereas effects from a
single government insider trade are limited. Further, politicians’ decisionmaking vis-à-vis their market positions is the pinnacle of corruption and threatens government integrity.
Fourth, a blind-trust requirement provides certainty. Government
officials will not need to worry about navigating the murky terrain of insider trading law. Rather, our public officials will be able to go about
their jobs certain that they are acting legally. Fifth, an ethics approach
avoids another legislative “fix” to our already ad hoc insider trading regime. As Part II’s discussion of current doctrine illustrated, insider
trading law is ill-defined. It is comprised of legislative mandates, judicial interpretation, and SEC application and enforcement. The contours of insider trading are difficult to ascertain. A legislative approach
to bring government insiders under section 10(b), such as the BairdSlaughter bills, would only add to the confusion. Part III notes that the
United Kingdom has adopted this approach, but it has been in the context of a comprehensive legislative definition of insider trading. The
United States is far from having such a comprehensive definition.
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A blind-trust requirement may be subject to various attacks. Of
course, it will be argued that the requirement may deter (wealthy) individuals from seeking public office. However, not only have some
current members of Congress elected to establish blind trusts, but
such a requirement is much less onerous than alternatives—namely,
complete divestiture. With blind trusts, members of Congress will
continue to be active market participants, cognizant of the returns on
their portfolios. Blind trusts will not “insulate a legislator from the
personal and economic interests” of her constituency—a primary con310
cern with divestiture.
A more legitimate criticism concerns whether trusts containing
non–publicly traded assets, such as ownership interests in a family
business, can ever be deemed “blind.” Trusts are not considered
“blind” until the covered individual—here, the member of Congress—
no longer knows the holdings of the trust. Of course, the member will
be aware of the specific assets held by the trust when it is formed, and
it is only when the trustee disposes of those specific assets, while pur311
chasing new assets, that the trust qualifies as “blind.” The question
then becomes how a trustee can dispose of non–publicly traded assets
in order to qualify as blind, or whether the member would even want
to relinquish ownership stake in, say, a family business. First, with regard to non–publicly traded assets, trustees could sell them in the private market, just not as easily as if the assets were traded on a public
exchange. Second, the question of a family business is more challenging. One solution would be to make a de minimis exception allowing
trusts to hold family businesses but require the members to recuse
themselves from votes that would potentially affect the business. The
quintessential family business only infrequently will be materially affected by national lawmaking and, accordingly, is unlikely to present
many conflicts. We should be much more concerned with members’
investments in large corporations, such as the asbestos-using firms discussed above, that are routinely affected by ongoing legislation.

310

See supra note 78 and accompanying text (citing HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL, supra
note 69, at 250; SENATE ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 71, at 124).
311
See Ballard, supra note 302, at 52 (“When a public official first establishes a
qualified blind trust, it cannot actually be ‘blind.’ By virtue of the newness of the trust,
the official knows what assets he transferred into it until a trustee notifies him that the
trust no longer holds the asset.”).
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2. Disclosure by Outside Actors: Shining Light on
Political-Intelligence Activities
Political-intelligence firms are the Washington equivalent of market professionals—analysts and researchers who expend considerable
time and resources to extract little-known, market-moving information. Part IV showed how market professionals are not deemed “insiders.” The reasoning is that these researchers and analysts are simply taking advantage of skills and training that are attainable by any
investor with the proper resources. Since virtually no one subscribes
to a view that all investors must possess the same resources, there is
nothing inherently unfair about trading on information derived by
market professionals.
Applying this rationale to K Street leads to the conclusion that
Washington lobbyists perform this same function. Any constituent
can access her member of Congress, follow political news, and track
legislative development, even without a lobbyist. Since access to information is not a problem, there is nothing “unfair” about hiring a
lobbyist to provide political intelligence.
Against this backdrop, however, is the political integrity concern
that discreet, coordinated efforts by high-powered lobbyists may undermine public trust in government. This is the exact concern animating public disclosure by lobbyists who seek to influence legislation.
Disclosure requirements, then, should be extended to cover those
who also seek to gain strategic information from Congress for trading
purposes. To that end, the Political Intelligence Disclosure Act introduced by Representatives Baird and Slaughter in 2008 provides an excellent vehicle.
Once implemented, disclosure of political-intelligence activities
puts members of Congress and their staff on notice. Capitol Hill can
decide when and with whom to share information. In the asbestos example, Senator Frist’s office would have at least known that it was disclosing the upcoming vote to hedge funds who, presumably, would
trade. If Senator Frist’s office decided to release the information anyway, it would be signaling that the information is not confidential.
Accordingly, the member of Congress makes the conscious decision
whether information will be public or not. Lastly, disclosure keeps the
public advised of the potential for political corruption by making political-intelligence gathering practices more well-known.
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C. Chilling Effects
At the outset, this Comment warned that we should not lose sight
of public policy objectives, which is easy to do when dealing with such
demonized figures as lobbyists, hedge funds, and politicians who are
perceived as corrupt. Bringing trading on political intelligence into
the fold of federal securities law loses sight of the bigger picture. One
concern with the insider trading approach is that it will make political
312
information inherently potent and thereby chill political dialogue
313
and efficient markets. Whether under the current doctrine, with its
great uncertainty, or a statutory approach that explicitly prohibits
trading on political information, those who possess political knowledge will be playing with fire.
1. Don’t Make It a Crime to Write My Congressman
Making political information potentially incriminating will threaten the political process. Central to legislative decisionmaking is
communication between elected officials and their constituents. Constituents reach out to Capitol Hill to stay informed and make their
312

One law firm has made the argument that the Baird-Slaughter legislation will
have a “chilling effect” on political participation:
[T]he STOCK Act could have a direct, chilling effect on the free interchange
of information between the Hill and outside lobbyists.
In its most far-reaching provision, H.R. 5015 would prohibit Members and
staff, as well as individuals off the Hill, from disclosing material nonpublic information obtained on the Hill regarding legislation if they have reason to believe that the information will be used to buy or sell securities. This means
that Members and staff would have to think twice before sharing otherwise
confidential information with any lobbyist or other individual who might conceivably use the information for personal investment purposes. Given that
this would be a criminal provision, some Members and staffers might be expected to curtail the sharing of valuable information related to legislation.
Moreover, a lobbyist who learned confidential information from a Member or
staffer would be at risk if they shared that information with others who then
traded on the information.
COVINGTON & BURLING, PROPOSED LEGISLATION ON CONGRESSIONAL “INSIDER TRADING”
COULD HAVE FAR-REACHING IMPACT ON LOBBYISTS 2 (2006), http://www.cov.com/
publications (follow “E-Alert & Advisory” hyperlink; then follow “2006” hyperlink).
313
Subsequent to the drafting of this Comment but prior to publication, a congressional committee received testimony from Professor Verret, who similarly argued
that regulating investors’ use of political information would inhibit market efficiency.
Hearing on Preventing Unfair Trading by Government Officials, supra note 48, available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/oihr_070609.shtml
(proposed statement of J.W. Verret, Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law).
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views known. This is important to democracy because it keeps lawmakers in touch with those they govern and guards against congressional insularity. Likewise, lawmakers reach out to constituent groups
for feedback on prospective legislation, to vet ideas, and to build consensus. For example, when Congress was considering the public trust
fund for claims against asbestos manufacturers, it most certainly
reached out to the trade associations representing the victims as well
as the manufacturers. This dialogue is valuable because it leads to
better-informed and politically viable legislation.
The insider trading approach will potentially make criminals out
of those who write their elected representatives. Although falling into
the trap is more complicated than merely writing Congress, this is the
public perception that will prevail. The perception of members giving
political inside information to constituents is enough to chill vital discourse. Members of Congress will be reluctant to exchange ideas with
constituent groups, and constituents will hesitate to monitor their
elected officials. The result will be an isolated legislative body, scared
to bounce ideas off of others, and an American public that views political knowledge as incriminating.
Equally important are the functions that lobbyists serve. Though
vilified, lobbyists are essential to the political process. They act as
translators to their clients, interpreting political maneuvers and obscure legislative processes. This intermediation is essential for many
groups to strategize about and effectively participate in the political
process. Insider trading regulation of political-intelligence gathering
will inhibit lobbyists from performing these functions, thereby threatening our participatory democracy. Any benefit of bringing politicalintelligence trading into the insider trading regime must be weighed
against these paramount threats to the democratic political process.
2. Don’t Discourage Market Efficiency
An efficient market is one “in which security prices reflect infor314
The idea is that stock prices reflect information instantaneously.”
mation that is available to the public, including past prices and cur315
rent performance.
Several forms of market efficiency—weak,
semistrong, and strong—are distinguished by the amount of informa-

314
315

BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 56, at G-5.
Id. at 359.
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316

tion that is reflected in a security’s price. Market efficiency is good
because it allows securities to be fairly and accurately priced.
A substantial amount of information that comes to the market is
not publicly released but rather is uncovered by market professionals
who expend significant resources to discover the information. It is
well understood that market professionals “who expend the resources
necessary to develop valuable information about a firm should be allowed to profit from it” as long as they are not breaching a fiduciary
317
duty.
Furthermore, market professionals’ activities should be encouraged because they lead to efficient markets. These “informed
traders” make purchases and sales using their informational advantages, thereby protecting even the “uninformed by driving prices to
318
their correct levels and making it safe to buy in ignorance.”
Lobbyists are Washington’s market professionals. To the same extent that market professionals’ activities are valued for helping to efficiently expose corporate information and accurately price stocks, K
Street lobbyists are exposing political information. Why distinguish
lobbyists from market professionals, as the Baird-Slaughter legislation
proposes? Not only would doing so be inconsistent, it is undesirable
to discourage outside actors from expending resources to ensure efficient markets. Mining nonpublic information does not simply help
the direct recipient of the information, but encourages accuracy of
prices, efficiency of markets, and protection of all investors.
CONCLUSION
Attempts to regulate trading based on political intelligence under
the federal securities laws are misguided. First, government insiders’
use of information acquired as a result of their official positions is not
insider trading, it is political corruption. An insider trading approach
only addresses one angle of the picture and leaves political insiders able
to make legislative decisions that maximize existing portfolios. Political

316

Id. The weak form of efficiency posits that current stock prices reflect past
prices. Id. The semistrong form asserts that current prices reflect past prices as well as
all “other published information, such as you might get from reading the financial
press.” Id. The strong form argues that current prices reflect all the information that
could possibly be acquired through a thorough analysis of the corporation and the
market. Id.
317
MACEY, supra note 100, at 4; see also id. at 68 (“Market professionals, who acquire a trading advantage by engaging in research rather than by breaching a fiduciary
duty, are free to trade.”).
318
Id. at 28.
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corruption should be addressed by ethics laws, not by distorting U.S. securities law. Specifically, a blind trust achieves the policy goals underlying insider trading law while more effectively combating congressional
conflicts. Second, outside actors who acquire, disseminate, and trade
upon political information from government sources, without an explicit agreement of confidentiality, are doing nothing wrong. These actors
are equivalent to market professionals, who devote resources to ferreting out information that is available to anyone. This service is essential
to the efficient functioning of our capital markets.

